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I. INTRODUCTION
Most environmental problems are localized: domestic sources
of environmental degradation bring about nearby effects for which
solutions exist under domestic law. However, there are problems
which national efforts cannot resolve, no matter how strong the po-
litical will to do so. For these problems, implementing solutions
depends on the willingness and ability of the international commu-
nity to act in concert, often through legally binding measures.
Commentators have recently written much about the green-
house effect; the threat that the continued build-up of certain
gases in the atmosphere will cause an increase in worldwide tem-
peratures.1 For example, some scientists speculate that a modest
increase in global temperatures could reduce the structural integ-
rity of the vast Western ice shelf of Antartica, which does not rest
on solid land and could cause the shelf to collapse long before it
would melt. If that were to happen, there would be a
rapid-perhaps even sudden-increase in ocean levels by as much
as six meters (19.7 feet).2 Most harbors would be destroyed and
valuable residential and commercial structures and agricultural
land-including most of South Florida-would be submerged.
3
The possibility, even if quite remote, of such catastrophic con-
1. Scientists suggest that if there were sufficient warming, in addition to other effects, a
gradual melting of the two polar ice caps would occur. As a result, over a considerable pe-
riod of time, low-lying coastal areas throughout the world would be flooded and other areas
could be damaged by wave action and storm effects. This "global warming" problem is dis-
cussed in greater detail infra part II(A).
2. Antartic Ice Potentially Unstable, 137 Sci NEws 285 (1990).
3. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SuRVEy MAP N2530-W 8000/30x60, Miami, Florida (1981).
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sequences illustrates two important points. First, global interna-
tional protection is a matter of major importance and deserves sus-
tained, high-level attention by the international community.
Second, harmful consequences may result from actions taken in ju-
risdictions far removed from the site of the damage.
International protection of the environment is too large a topic
for one "perspective" to cover adequately. The purposes of this pa-
per are accordingly far more modest: 1) to provide a brief overview
on the status of some of the key international environmental
problems; 2) to assess how well the international community is
dealing with them; 3) to undertake a preliminary inquiry into the
success of the international community in establishing the institu-
tions, organizations, treaties, and norms of behavior needed to es-
tablish an effective international environmental protection regime;
and 4) to suggest near-term courses of conduct which would make
the regime more effective.
II. THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
For over a century, farsighted individuals, organizations, and,
occasionally, governments have emphasized the dangers in wasting
natural resources and have suggested conservation measures. At
about the same time, doctors began to recognize the public health
consequences of imprudent disposal of sewage and garbage and the
impact of exposing workers to industrial chemicals. Unfortunately,
while science was making rapid strides in such diverse fields as
ecology, toxicology, epidemiology, and detection of trace quantities
of contaminants, no general conception of mankind as a constitu-
ent element of "the environment" entered the public
consciousness.
Beginning in the early 1960s, a series of severe environmental
problems' and the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring'
galvanized the public in several developed countries. Nevertheless,
even where environmental concerns did come to the forefront of
4. Among the problems which first raised public consciousness were rivers which
foamed because of non-degradable detergents, "smog" in several countries, the impact of
dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (DDT) on birds of prey, and the recognition of serious
health consequences from mercury contamination in Japan. For example, the Chiss Corpo-
ration dumped tons of mercury into one of the richest fishing grounds in Japan. Sanger,
Japan and the Mercury-Poisoned Sea: A Reckoning That Won't Go Away, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
5. R. CARSON. SILENT SPRING (1962).
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public discourse, policy makers generally considered the problems
domestic matters, and not proper concerns of international law or
diplomacy.
More recently, scientific inquiry has brought to light several
potentially catastrophic global problems which can arise without
obvious early symptoms. These problems and a greater public
awareness of global interdependence have focused attention on
human activities which cause adverse environmental consequences
across national frontiers and which no nation acting alone can
resolve.
One major consequence of the increased environmental aware-
ness has been a newfound sense of urgency among affected publics
and their leaders. Only a few years ago, it was nearly impossible to
get world leaders to make more than passing reference to the need
for international cooperation on the environment.' That posture
has changed dramatically over the past three years. The last two
Western Seven Nation Economic Summits placed the environment
as one of their highest priority topics.' In addition, Soviet leader
Gorbachev made the need for concerted action on the environment
a key point in his highly publicized speech at the United Nations
(U.N.).8
Much of the current attention at the international level is a
spill-over from domestic environmental concerns which have ele-
vated the environment to a central issue in recent elections in sev-
eral Western countries9 and are engendering a growing political
6. There were occasional exceptions, such as the November 6, 1969 meeting of the
Heads of State of the North Atlantic Council, which established the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Committee on the Challenges of a Modern Society. See Train, A New
Approach to International Environmental Cooperation: The NATO Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society, 22 U. KAN. L. REv. 167, 171 (1973).
7. Summit of the Arch, 89 Dm'T ST. BULL. 1, 15 (Sept. 1989); 1990 Western Seven
Nation Economic Summit, see Economic Declaration Issued by Group of Seven Industrial
Nations at the Conclusion of Their Economic Summit in Houston July 11, 1990, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1127 (July 18, 1990).
8. Gorbachev Proposes Emergency Unit to Provide Environment Assistance, 11 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 651-52 (Dec. 14, 1988).
9. Debate over environmental matters was important in the last U.S. presidential elec-
tion. Governor Dukakis attacked then Vice President Bush's record generally and his sup-
port for off-shore oil drilling in particular. Meanwhile, Bush declared himself an environ-
mentalist (on that issue creating a differing public posture from that of President Reagan),
and attacked Dukakis for failing to clean up Boston Harbor. See Thompson, The Environ-
ment: Cleaning up the Mess, TimF, Sept. 19, 1988, at 23. Concern over the environmental
impact of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement was frequently raised in the Canadian
national elections. See Acid Rain Treaty to Top Agenda in Meeting with Bush, Mulroney
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movement in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 0 One is
tempted to reach the cynical conclusion that, like appointing a
study commission, urging international cooperation is one means
political leaders use to avoid making difficult decisions about do-
mestic problems. Yet, taken too far, such cynicism blinds us to the
new reality: a quagmire of recently recognized international envi-
ronmental problems has come to the forefront demanding the ac-
tion of the international community, which is beginning to
respond.
The discussion in this part is not intended to be exhaustive,
but rather illustrative of the problems which may require interna-
tional solutions."
A. Global Warming
A key global environmental problem is the risk of global
warming due to the build-up of ever-greater quantities of carbon
dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and other natural
and man-made gases in the atmosphere. When the sun's radiant
energy strikes the earth, much of it is converted to heat. "Green-
house gases" cause the earth's atmosphere to retain more of that
converted heat, thereby increasing the earth's average
temperature. 2
Says, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 666 (Dec. 14, 1988) [hereinafter Acid Rain
Treaty]. Green (environmentalist) parties have recently captured considerable popular sup-
port in Western Europe and enough seats in the European Parliament of the European
Community (EC) to establish a formal block. Coalition of Greens, Other Leftists Gain Slim
Majority in EC Parliament, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 336 (July 1989).
10. Environmental matters received considerable attention in the debates of the Soviet
Union's Congress of People's Deputies called to adopt a new governmental structure and
elect members to a new Supreme Soviet. See Trimble, Reform is Risky Business, U.S. Naws
& WOaL REP., June 19, 1989, at 27. The Soviet Union is also forming the Ecology Commit-
tee of the Supreme Soviet, a parallel institution to our Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). News Briefing (Justice Dep't - Stewart), Fed. News Service, Aug. 17, 1990 (wire
service).
11. Some major issues have been excluded due to length constraints and their similarity
to issues which are discussed. For example, erosion and salination are serious problems
which have many features in common with the problems of desertification and deforesta-
tion. Additionally, a narrow view is taken here on what is "environmental." Overpopulation,
the protection of cultural and historical resources, indigent peoples' rights, and many other
problems are closely allied with many of the world's environmental problems but are not
included in this discussion.
12. Put more precisely, a temperature increase can occur because certain gases have the
capacity to let ordinary light pass and to retain infra-red light (the wavelengths of radiant
heat) in much the same way that glass in a greenhouse allows light to enter, but prohibits
the resulting heat from escaping. See Matthews, Under the Sun, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct.
19901 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME 685
Both the certainty of the greenhouse effect and the severity of
its consequences are still subject to scientific debate. '8 Neverthe-
less, there is little doubt that the emission of greenhouse gases and
their concentration in the atmosphere have increased over the past
century. Moreover, there is evidence that global temperatures have
already risen slightly." Many scientists believe there will be signif-
icant further increases, on the order of two to five degrees Celsius
(3.6 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit) within the next sixty years.'"
Scientists have postulated that even modest further increases
in global temperatures would have widespread consequences. Per-
haps the most severe of these consequences is the likelihood that
global climate patterns could be significantly altered."i If such
changes occur rapidly, they are far more likely to be harmful than
beneficial.1 7 In some locations, the consequences might be severe.
Although science is not currently able to predict which cli-
matic changes might take place in which locations,' greater dry-
ness in some locations and an increase in the number and severity
of floods and hurricanes in other locations is probable. It takes lit-
tle imagination to foresee the effects of even a slight reduction in
average humidity in the Sahel region of Africa or of additional
flooding in the low-lying delta region of Bangladesh. In such
places, even Herculean efforts might not be enough to prevent
1990, at 66, 74-75. Without this greenhouse effect, the surface of the earth would be about
33'C (91.4*F) cooler than it presently is. Thus, the phenomenon is necessary for life as we
know it on earth. Rowlands, The Security Challenges of Global Environmental Change, 14
WASH. Q. 99 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Knox, Sulfur-Climate Link Called Insignificant, 134 Sci. NEws 375
(1988).
14. See Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law-A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 375 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Shabecoff, Team of Scientists Sees Substantial Warming of Earth, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 16, 1990, at B7, col. 1.
16. One of the few points on which there seems to be unanimity is the improbability
that a rise in average temperatures would be uniformly distributed across the globe, with no
other consequences. See Under the Sun, supra note 12, at 82.
17. Over a long period of time (centuries), a change to new climatic conditions might
not necessarily be disadvantageous. Given sufficient time, nature optimizes biological pro-
duction (both in diversity of species and number of individuals) at a given location for a
particular set of conditions. For that reason, change followed by protracted stability might
yield new-but not necessarily worse-ecological conditions. Indeed, in individual cases,
these consequences might be positive. For example, in some colder climates with adequate
water, increased warmth might lead to greater agricultural production. Unfortunately, in the
short run (decades), such positive benefits are more likely to be the exception than the rule.
Moreover, subsequent additional warming would be likely to destroy any such benefits.
18. Under the Sun, supra note 12, at 82.
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widespread suffering. Furthermore, if one of the world's major
grain-producing regions were lost without corresponding favorable
climatic changes taking place elsewhere, global food shortages
would result. These changes would seriously aggravate current in-
adequate nutritional standards in much of the developing world, a
problem made more difficult by an ever-increasing global
population.'9
Apart from changes in climate patterns, global warming might
also cause the average level of the world's oceans to rise within the
next half century by amounts variously estimated from several mil-
limeters to meters (less than an inch to several feet).2 0 An increase
of a meter may not sound significant, but it would be enough to
destroy valuable beach, harbor, and other economic assets, increase
the damage and loss of life from hurricanes and typhoons in low-
lying locations, and cause salt intrusions into fresh groundwater
and surface waters. The resulting reduction in the availability of
fresh water would have serious implications for agriculture and, in
certain regions, for the adequacy of human water supplies.
According to current theory, global warming results from a
combination of increased release of greenhouse gases and a relative
reduction in their natural elimination from the atmosphere. While
some of the causal processes occur in nature, the recent change is
wholly due to human activity.
There are many culprits responsible for the increased release
of these greenhouse gases. First, the widespread burning of fossil
fuels creates large quantities of carbon dioxide. 21 While there is
ample blame for the over-use of these fuels, the worst offenders are
primarily the developed countries, particularly the U.S.2 Second,
19. The U.N. Population Fund's 1990 report argues that environmental degradation is
now the greatest threat posed by over-population. World population has now passed 5.3
billion and is expected to stabilize at 11 billion. These estimates are higher than the U.N.'s
previous predictions. Schoon, The Weight of Humanity: Population Growth Has Alarm-
ingly Overshot UN Projections, Independent, May 21, 1990, at 17, col. 1; Hughes, No Ban-
ner Year for Despots, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 3, 1991, at 18, col. 4. For a discussion of
the population growth and global resources, see PasseU, Economists Start to Fret Again
About Population, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1990, at C1, col 5.
20. Is The World Heating Up? Well, Just Listen, Bus. Wi-, Feb. 4, 1991, at 82.
21. After water vapor, carbon dioxide is the most abundant heat-absorbing gas. Carbon
dioxide has a residence time of up to 100 years in the atmosphere. Under the Sun, supra
note 12, at 79.
22. According to a U.N. sponsored study, the World Resources Institute reported that
in 1987 the U.S. accounted for 17.6 percent of important greenhouse gases, the U.S.S.R. for
12.0 percent, and Brazil for 10.5 percent. They were followed by China, India, Japan, West
[Vol. 21:3
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CFCs are released by the breakdown or repair of air conditioners
and refrigerators, from the solvent cleaning of clothes and elec-
tronic parts, and from the production and use of foam insulation
and objects. 3 The industrial countries are disproportionately re-
sponsible for these releases of CFCs. 4 Finally, methane (the pri-
mary component in natural gas) is being released as a by-product
of farming (which includes deforestation) and landfills.2
5
While the release of these gases into the atmosphere grows,
other human activities have reduced the capacity of the biosphere
to remove the greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. Chief among
these activities is deforestation, particularly in the tropics. Trees
and other plant life absorb carbon dioxide from the air and convert
it to hydrocarbons, such as cellulose. When forests are harvested
(particularly without replanting), one result is to reduce the
amount of carbon dioxide formerly removed from the atmosphere
by the forests. Tropical rain forests are particularly adept at re-
moving carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Therefore, the rapid
loss of these forests to logging and to slash-and-burn agriculture is
most unfortunate.26
Toxic pollution of the oceans may also reduce the biosphere's
ability to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. While the
causal evidence of oceanic degradation is more speculative than
that of deforestation, modern industrial and agricultural activities
release large quantities of heavy metals and persistent toxic chemi-
cals into the oceans. As the releases are generally close to shore,
the impact is felt most severely in coastal waters, especially in es-
Germany, the U.K., Indonesia, France, Italy, and Canada. Palmer, Due to Deforestation,
Poor Cause Nearly Half Greenhouse Effect, Reuters, June 7, 1990 (wire service).
23. Under the Sun, supra note 12, at 94; Regulatory Agenda, 55 Fed. Reg. 45,134
(1990).
24. Chlorofluorocarbons survive as long as 400 years and are up to 16,000 times more
effective than carbon dioxide in absorbing infra-red heat. Under the Sun, supra note 12, at
79.
25. Methane has a residence time of up to only 10 years, but molecule for molecule it
absorbs 20 to 30 times more infra-red heat than carbon dioxide. Id. at 76.
26. It is sometimes possible to replace the forests with agricultural crops which grow
even more rapidly and which thus remove even more carbon dioxide from the air. Indeed,
these crops would apparently do a better job of removing carbon dioxide from the atmo-
sphere than existing tropical forests, since they grow far more rapidly than tropical hard-
woods. However, if the bulk of the plants so produced is either burned or plowed under, the
result is the re-release of the carbon dioxide or the generation of methane. In those cases,
the net effect is an increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases when compared to reforesta-
tion. On a positive note, there are crops to which that scenario might not necessarily apply.
See infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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tuaries and bays. Algae acts, much like trees, to remove greenhouse
gases from the atmosphere.2 7 If such toxic pollution is causing a
global reduction in the supply of beneficial plankton, it may mean
a global reduction in the capacity of the oceans to remove carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere.2
To date, no binding steps have been taken to decrease the
build-up of greenhouse gases per se."9 Repeated efforts to reach
agreement on long-range, mandatory reductions in carbon dioxide
emissions have been blocked by the U.S.8" However, responding to
a report by the Scientists' Working Group of the Inter-Govern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), then British Prime Min-
ister Margaret Thatcher, who with Japan had previously supported
the U.S. position, committed the U.K. to freeze carbon dioxide
emissions at today's levels by the year 2005.1'
Unfortunately, it is not going to be easy to halt global warm-
ing. No nation can solve the problem acting alone. Even if several
developed countries agreed to reduce the amount of fossil fuels
they used, that would not halt the long-term build-up of green-
house gases. Indeed, the resulting reduction in demand for fossil
fuels in these countries would lower global prices, stimulating
greater fossil fuel use in countries which did not cooperate in the
conservation effort.
3 2
Both developed and developing countries have a great deal to
lose if significant warming takes place. Nevertheless, negotiating
27. Photosynthesis by algae as well as other chemical processes, helps remove the dis-
solved carbon dioxide in the oceans. Under the Sun, supra note 12, at 74.
28. Scientists are currently speculating about the possibility of fertilizing the oceans
around Antarctica to promote algae growth. This would result in an estimated one billion
tons of extra carbon being pulled from the atmosphere. Ideas for Making Ocean Trap Car-
bon Dioxide Arouse Hope and Fear, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1990, at C4, col. 1.
29. The Montreal Protocol restricting the use of CFCs, discussed infra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text, should have the side-benefit of slowing the increase of that portion of
the greenhouse effect attributable to CFCs in the upper atmosphere. At best, that repre-
sents a modest contribution to the resolution of the problem.
30. Most recently, the U.S. played the key role in blocking efforts at the Western Seven
Nation Economic Summit to develop a plan to combat global warming. Lauter, Decision on
Global Warming and Ozone Show 2 Sides of Bush, L.A. Times, July 11, 1990, at A10, col. 1.
31. Leggett, The Cut Thatcher Does Not Want to Make, Independent, May 28, 1990,
at 14, col. 1. See also Laroi, Japan Suggests Ecology Steps, Stops Short of Curbing Indus-
try, Reuters, May 18, 1990 (wire service).
32. Population increases and greater industrialization in developing countries are likely
to bring about significant increases in their release of greenhouse gases. For a few countries
to reduce their emissions while others increase them would hardly be an effective control
strategy.
[Vol. 21:3
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concrete measures that effectively reduce greenhouse gas releases
and increase carbon dioxide removal will be no small task, given
the many nations whose cooperation in this matter is essential.
Any solution will involve significant sacrifices by the parties con-
cerned.33 This does not mean there are no technically feasible solu-
tions; it does mean that the global political will and our sense of
common interest and reciprocal obligation will be severely tested.
Consider the following example. " There are several families of
plants, including bamboo, rattan, and rice, which grow very rapidly
in the tropics and which produce a fiber capable of being manufac-
tured into paper. Planting these as cash crops could reduce the
need to harvest timber for paper pulp in more northerly countries
and also reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere."5
Even if paper products from these new sources proved to be
economically competitive with existing supplies, there would be
significant barriers to overcome. Developing countries are not
likely to undertake the considerable human, capital, and infra-
structure investment involved in planting, processing, and bringing
these crops to the market without financial aid. Some assurances
from the prospective purchasing countries that the sellers will have
reliable access to markets for such paper would be required. It is
uncertain whether the governments of the developed countries will
be willing to provide the capital resources. Even if they are it is not
clear whether they will guarantee that the resources they provide
for this use are a net increase in financial aid. The developing
countries are likely to resist any program if it accompanies a re-
duction in funding for other matters on which they were relying
and which have a higher priority for them. Will the general public
of developed countries be willing to support expanded funding
33. In addition to the considerable expenses (and the attendant reduction in economic
growth) which may be involved in the reduction of the emissions of greenhouse gases, there
could be other consequences. We might be compelled to accept the lesser of two evils by, for
example, approving large-scale nuclear and hydroelectric generation schemes which environ-
mentalists and others previously resisted on environmental grounds.
34. The example discussed in the text is neither the most important problem nor one
for which the political difficulties involved are uniquely difficult. It is merely one example of
the many dilemmas that the international community will need to face if it decides to get
serious about global warming.
35. Indeed, these crops would apparently do a better job of removing carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere than existing tropical forests, since they grow far more rapidly than
tropical hardwoods. Telephone interview by Michelle De Wald with Chris Rollins, Director
of the Preston B. Bird & Mary Heinlen Fruit and Spice Park, in Homestead, Florida (Mar.
1990).
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when faced with competing domestic demands? Will their willing-
ness to do so erode if their own standards of living are somewhat
reduced by domestic measures to curtail the emission of green-
house gases? Will they support such funding even if it means seri-
ous harm to domestic pulp and paper production?"6 Will environ-
mental organizations support such crop development even if it
results in the loss of additional tropical rain forest and the con-
comitant loss of habitat for endangered species?37 Will their enthu-
siasm flag if lower-cost pulp and paper from developing countries
reduces the domestic incentives to recycle newspapers? Although
these difficulties may not prove to be insurmountable, the ques-
tions illustrate the complexity and the need for strong political will
inherent in the global warming problem, which dwarfs all previous
international environmental protection issues.
As discussed more thoroughly later, it may be better, when
looking for models to emulate to obtain international agreement on
global warming, to examine other complex and politicized interna-
tional legal and diplomatic approaches, rather than to just consider
recent environmental protection efforts. The international commu-
nity has considerable experience with such difficult issues as regu-
lation of international trade, slowing the spread of nuclear weap-
ons, and the law of the sea. Lessons learned from the law and
diplomacy of these issues should be studied as we enter into nego-
tiations on global warming or any other critical and intricate envi-
ronmental problem.
B. Depletion of the Ozone Layer
There is now a general consensus that free chlorine in the
stratosphere (the upper atmosphere) can cause a serious depletioi
36. Paper is an important industry in many of the countries which are the most vocal
about global environmental protection, including the U.S., Canada, Sweden, and Finland.
See 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 382 (1990).
37. These crops might reduce carbon dioxide more efficiently than untouched tropical
hardwoods, since they grow faster. They would not provide the uniquely rich habitats found
in tropical rain forests. See infra part III(F)(4). This does not mean there is always a con-
flict between efforts to reduce global warming and profitable use of tropical lands. For ex-
ample, there are already millions of acres of the Amazon which were cleared for pastureland
but were subsequently abandoned. Their reforestation and ultimate logging would reduce
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and provide employment and profit. See C. Uhl, D. Nep-
stad, R. Buschbacher, K. Clark, B. Kauffman, & S. Subler, Studies and Ecosystem Re-
sponse to Natural and Anthropogenic Disturbances Provide Guidelines for Designing Suit-
able Land-Use System in Amazonia, in ALTERNATIVES TO DaFORESTATION 35 (A.B. Anderson
ed. 1990).
(Vol. 21:3
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of its ozone and that further depletion of the ozone layer would
result in large increases in ultra-violet (UV) radiation reaching the
earth's surface." Most scientists believe that greater UV exposure
would greatly increase the amount of skin cancer and eye disease.5 0
Some scientists also believe that increases in UV light reaching the
earth's surface would harm agricultural production and might even
interfere with the reproduction of aquatic microorganisms on
which the entire aquatic food chain (and possibly our best protec-
tion from global warming) rests.40
In contrast to the global warming problem, there has been tan-
gible progress toward protection of the ozone layer. The depletion
of the ozone layer has been blamed primarily on the release of
CFCs, 1 halons,4 2 and a few other chemicals.43 In 1978, the U.S.,
38. When an UV ray strikes a CFC molecule, it releases a chlorine atom. That chlorine
then breaks an ozone molecule (which is made up of three oxygen atoms) into ordinary
oxygen (two atoms of oxygen). The chlorine atom then combines with the freed oxygen atom
to form chlorine monochloride. However, this bond is easily broken by another free oxygen
atom. Thus, the chlorine atom is freed to conduct its destructive activities-which it may do
100,000 times before it is finally neutralized. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg.
47,489 (1987); Under the Sun, supra note 12, at 91.
39. Middle and long wavelenghts of UV are responsible for the most prevalent forms of
skin cancer. Id. at 95.
40. See 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,495-96 (1987) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987). Increased UV
radiation reaching the earth does not correlate exactly with an increase in human exposure,
given changes in leisure-time activities and the public's willingness to take protective mea-
sures. Other environmental factors can also have an impact. In the U.S., for example, 74%
of the public is concentrated in urban areas. 20 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 102 (1990).
Localized pollution of urban air may actually provide some protection from the increased
UV levels. See Luoma, SO2 , UV, Vitamin D, and Calcium: The Acid Rain-Cancer Con-
nection, AUDUBON, July 1988, at 28; Global Smog: Newest Greenhouse Projection, 135 Sci.
NEws 262 (1989). Even if true, the adverse health effects of urban air pollution greatly out-
weigh the benefits of reduced UV exposure.
41. Chlorofluorocarbons are a class of chemical compounds containing only carbon,
chlorine, and fluorine atoms. These substances are non-toxic, non-explosive, very difficult to
burn, and have high solvent power. As a result, despite their relatively high expense, they
have been widely used in air conditioning and refrigeration, solvent cleaning, production of
foam insulation, aerosol propulsion, and numerous other applications. See Reinhold, Frus-
trated by Global Efforts, City Fights Ozone on Its Own, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1989, at Al,
col. 5. Worldwide, the production of CFCs and goods which rely on them is a multi-billion
dollar enterprise. Apart from their economic value, CFCs make important non-economic
contributions, particularly to refrigeration, which significantly increases the safety of the
world's food supply.
42. Halons are a class of chemicals containing bromine, like chlorine a halogen capable
of ozone depletion. They are used largely for fire-fighting and fire-prevention. Halon releases
are tiny when compared with CFC releases, but molecule for molecule, halons are far more
effective depleters of ozone. 56 Fed. Reg. 2420 (1991); Bradsher, The Danger of a Fire
Fighting Wonder, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at Dl, col. 3; FUNDAMENTALS OF CHEMISTRY 848
(J.E. Brady & J.R. Holum 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS].
43. Two other chemicals, carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform have also been
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based on the evidence available at that time, barred the use of
CFCs for aerosol propulsion.44 Only a few countries followed suit."
At that time the U.S. constituted a high percentage of the global
CFC market. For several years, the elimination of this single use in
a few countries resulted in a worldwide reduction of total CFC re-
leases. More recently, as non-aerosol uses grew in the U.S. and as
CFC uses grew even more rapidly elsewhere, global releases of
CFCs approached and then passed the pre-ban levels.4
In the meantime, scientific evidence continued to mount that
depletion of the ozone layer was actually taking place and that free
chlorine could be detected in the stratosphere. In response, the in-
ternational community negotiated the Vienna Convention4 7 which
established the goal of protecting the ozone layer and constructed
a framework for further international cooperation. The Vienna
Convention did not require any reductions in CFC releases. In
1987, the Convention parties negotiated the Montreal Protocol.'"
The Protocol requires a freeze in CFC production (with certain ex-
ceptions) followed by a gradual phase down of CFC use.
Additional scientific evidence led many environmentalists to
charge that the Montreal Protocol's provisions were inadequate to
prevent serious harm to the ozone layer from taking place. Faced
with such a charge, both the U.S. and the EC (the two largest pro-
ducers and users of CFCs) announced domestic measures which
went well beyond the requirements of the Montreal Protocol."' On
implicated as ozone layer depleters. The former is no longer used in significant quantities in
the U.S., except as an intermediate in the production of other substances, but is in common
use as a solvent in other countries. Methyl chloroform (also called 1,1,1-Trichloroethane) is
one of the most common industrial chemicals and is also used in some consumer products.
Ozone Treaty Will Force Changes in Consumer Goods, Gannett News Service, July 11, 1990
(wire service).
44. Parallel bans were adopted by the EPA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (1978). The
primary ban was by the EPA. 40 C.F.R. pt. 762 (1988).
45. Among the countries which banned aerosol uses of CFCs were Canada, Sweden, and
Norway. See 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988). These countries are all northern latitude states
which would be particularly vulnerable to ozone depletion. The EC and Japan decided
against a CFC ban but did agree to limit the growth of new CFC production facilities. See
Council of European Communities Decision Concerning Chlorofluorocarbons in the Envi-
ronment, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. 90) 80 (1980).
46. 52 Fed. Reg. 47,490 (1987).
47. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 LL.M.
1516 (1987).
48. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
49. The U.S. passed a tax on Ozone Depleting Chemicals effective Jan. 1, 1990. 26
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the other hand, China, India, and other large developing countries,
on whom the success of the Montreal Protocol approach largely
depends, made clear they were not prepared to become parties to
it, unless the developed countries provided assistance in the devel-
opment, manufacturing, and use of substitutes.
At the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
during June 20-29, 1990, the provisions of the 1987 Montreal Pro-
tocol were tightened. In addition, the parties agreed to establish a
fund which will assist developing countries.50 Nevertheless, some
environmentalists still do not believe these changes will adequately
solve the problem of ozone depletion."
While the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol and its subse-
quent strengthening are major accomplishments, the ultimate suc-
cess of the Protocol's approach will depend primarily on whether
the newly adopted fund5 1 is sufficient to attract the adherence and
active cooperation of the developing countries, which worry that
their development could be significantly harmed if CFCs become
unavailable. This is hardly a theoretical issue. Among the most de-
sired goods in developing countries are refrigerators, which make
major contributions to standards of living and public health. Man-
ufacturers of refrigerators use CFCs both as the refrigerant gas and
in the production of the refrigerator's insulation. Substitutes will
U.S.C.A. §§ 4681-4682 (West Supp. 1990). The tax was intended to suppress CFC demand
and, by recouping excess profits, provide greater incentive for the development of ozone-safe
alternatives. Because these temporary regulations are affecting persons other than manufac-
turers and importers of ozone-depleting chemicals, the tax can be interpreted as a revenue
raising device. 56 Fed. Reg. 18 (1991). The European Community is likely to. phase out
CFCs by 1997, three years ahead of the international deadline. Council of Ministers Favor
Regulation to Phase out Chlorofluorocarbons by 1997, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 3
(Jan. 1, 91).
50. The parties agreed that the five CFCs regulated by the 1987 Montreal Protocol will
be phased out by the year 2000, with cuts in consumption below the 1986 levels of 50% by
1995 and 85% by 1997. Additionally, methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride were
added to the Montreal Protocol. Whereas the 1987 Montreal Protocol merely froze con-
sumption of halons at 1986 levels by 1992, the new agreement will completely phase them
out by the year 2000. Meadows, New Ozone Accord is One Giant Step for Mankind, L.A.
Times, July 8, 1990, at M2, col. 4; Chynoweth, Tougher CFC Rules are Adopted, CHEMICAL
WEEK, July 4-11, 1990, at 12.
51. Brice, Critics Say New Ozone Agreement Not Strong Enough, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, July 2, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
52. The U.S. agreed to provide money towards the fund to enable Third World nations
to phase out CFCs. Set up under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), this CFC fund may be folded into the broader environmental fund the
World Bank (or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-IBRD) is trying to
establish. U.S. to Take a Kinder View of World Bank's 'Green Fund,' vol. 14, Bank Letter,
No. 27, 4, July 9, 1990 (wire service).
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almost certainly be more expensive, thereby making refrigeration
less widely available. Moreover, developing countries fear the de-
veloped countries will use their patent position and know-how to
oligopolize the production of substitute products.
The developing countries were right in pressing for a fund and
ultimately prevailed over Luddites on the White House staff. Nev-
ertheless, it would be a tactical error for the developing countries
to overplay their hand on this issue. They should not seek to use it
to obtain additional concessions on matters unrelated to their con-
cerns about the direct impact of a CFC ban on their develop-
ment. 3 For reasons discussed more fully later, it would be a severe
blow to the interests of both the developed and the developing
countries if the North-South debates of the recent past were to
continue, resulting in confrontations over this issue.
The international fund to help developing nations came about
primarily because the Bush Administration suddenly reversed its
stance on this issue. Prior to this decision, the U.S. had rejected an
EC plan for a $100,000,000 fund, arguing that the World Bank
could handle the need through existing programs. Observers
roundly criticized that stance as insensitive to the developing
countries' legitimate needs and cynical, given the World Bank's
anti-environmental reputation. Moreover, the U.S.'s share would
have been only $20,000,000, a trivial fraction of the several billion
dollars in tax revenues the U.S. Treasury will receive from the new
CFC tax.5 4 Key factors in causing a reversal in the President's po-
sition change were lobbying efforts by U.S. chemical firms which
reason that money can be made by producing new products to re-
place those regulated by the Montreal Protocol and by Secretary of
State James Baker's warning that dogged resistance to a Third
World Aid Fund was upsetting relations with European allies.55
53. The Montreal Protocol contains a powerful sanction, ultimately requiring parties to
forbid the importation of products containing CFCs or products produced through the use
of CFCs, from non-Montreal Protocol parties which are not in compliance with the Mon-
treal Protocol's provisions. Montreal Protocol, supra note 48, art. 4. Adiditionally, though
conceptually simple, the efficient production of CFCs requires special equipment to handle
extraordinarily toxic and corrosive fluorine gas. Export controls imposed by developed coun-
tries on CFC production equipment could render the indigenous production of CFCs risky
and considerably more expensive.
54. See supra note 46.
55. Lauter, supra note 30. Sadly, the merits of the case for a fund, which were quite
compelling, were reportedly not a significant factor in the change.
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C. Acid Deposition
Europe and North America have recently experienced a wide-
spread decline in the biological productivity of many lakes. Some
lakes have become sterile, with fish and other life forms literally
disappearing. The loss of functional lake ecosystems is the result of
increasing acidity from rain and snow which have a low pH level.6
In Europe, this "acid rain" is implicated in the wide-spread de-
struction of forest regions. While some scientific controversy on
this point remains, the acidity of the precipitation on both conti-
nents is primarily the result of fossil fuel use, especially coal and
oil. Upon combustion, fuels containing sulfur form sulfur dioxide,
which, when combined with water, becomes sulfuric acid. High
temperature combustion can also create various nitrogen oxides
which form nitric acid. Researchers have collected rain samples in
Canada and the Northeastern portions of the U.S. that have pH
levels close to that of vinegar (pH of approximately 2.8)." Most
aquatic organisms cannot reproduce in water that acidic; conse-
quently the entire food chain of a lake or stream can be dis-
rupted," effectively rendering the water "dead."
While this explanation of the causes of acidification is gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community, its details are still the
subject of controversy." There is a lively debate, for example, as to
how much of the natural buffering capacity of certain lakes has
been used up.e° (If largely exhausted, the situation could rapidly
worsen.) Scientists also differ on how much of the acidifying agents
are released by coal-fired power plants, and how much from more
diffuse sources such as automobiles (which are harder to do any-
thing about)."1 Finally, there is some uncertainty as to the amount
of reduction in sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions which will be
needed in order to bring the problem back under control. This last
56. On the pH scale (which reflects the concentration of hydrogen ions), 7.0 is neutral,
and numbers below this figure are acidic. The scale is logarithmic, meaning that relatively
small changes in the index number represent large shifts in relative acidity. FUNDAMENTALS,
supra note 42, at 601-07.
57. See Scientists Study Mountain Tree Deaths, Proprietary to United Press Int'l,
Aug. 10, 1986 (wire service).
58. Raloff, Acid Rain: Lowdown on Health of Lakes, 135 Sci. NEws 311 (1989).
59. See McMillan Highly Critical of U.S. Report, Calls It Scientifically Flawed, Mis-
leading, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 8-9 (Jan. 13, 1988).
60. Krug, Fish Story: The Great Acid Rain Flimflam, POL'Y REv., Spring 1990, at 44.
61. Inventory of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Issued, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at
1430 (Dec. 22, 1989).
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issue is particularly important, as controls are going to involve
multi-billion dollar costs, which are likely to be borne largely by
the electric utilities and, ultimately, their rate-payers.
8 2
Despite these uncertainties, the problem is similar to most
other domestic pollution situations.6 s What makes acid deposition
different from most domestic pollution issues is the very long dis-
tances from the source of the pollution to the point of impact., As
a result, acid deposition has become an international issue to a far
greater degree than most other air and water pollution problems.6 s
To date, relatively little of a concrete nature has been accom-
plished internationally to combat acid precipitation. To be sure, an
agreement was recently negotiated under the auspices of the U.N.'s
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE),6 s in which the parties
62. The overall cost of environmental compliance may be as high as $25 billion.
Shabecoff, Bush Presses Conferees to Accept Compromise on Clean Air, N.Y. Times, Sept.
27, 1990, at B8, col. 1.
63. As with most domestic pollution problems, acid rain control involves judging poten-
tial tradeoffs between economic well-being and other interests such as the enjoyment of
nature; balancing competing economic interests (power plants and their customers 'versus
tourism, fishing, and forestry interests); and determining the optimal control strategy and
technologies, the pace of change, and the allocation of financial responsibility for the re-
quired pollution abatement measures.
64. Ironically, in both North America and Western Europe, these long-range effects are
largely the consequence of the installation of "tall stacks" in an earlier decade as a way of
eliminating local effects of pollution from factories and power plants. Prevailing thought at
the time believed these huge smoke-stacks eliminated the harm at a relatively low cost. As
often happens, the solution to one problem simply became the cause of the next problem. It
suggests strongly the undesirability of simply dispersing persistent pollutants as an environ-
mental protection strategy, or of proceeding with any control strategies whose consequences
are not understood.
65. Acid rain has been a major irritant, indeed, perhaps the major irritant, in recent
U.S.-Canadian relations. See Acid Rain Treaty, supra note 9. However, the Bush Adminis-
tration consistently supported a modification of the U.S. Clean Air Act that will bring about
a 10 million ton per year reduction in the amount of sulfur dioxide emitted by the year 2000
and a 2 million ton reduction in nitrogen oxides. INSIDE EPA, June 16, 1989, at 7. Interest-
ingly, in the U.S.-Canadian case, acidified precipitation flows across both borders. Most
often, the pollutants have their origins in electric power plants located in the U.S. Midwest,
precipitating out over Quebec, the Maritime Provinces, and the U.S. New England States.
However, with other wind conditions, it can begin at power plants and smelters in Canada,
particularly on the Niagara peninsula, and precipitate over New York, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, or New England. Acid precipitation has also been a political problem in Europe,
where Germany, whose forests have been particularly severely hit, believes that the problem
has its origins largely in the U.K., and, to a lesser extent, Ireland, France, and the Benelux
countries. See generally G. WmrSTON & A. ROSENCRANZ, Acr RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH
Am incA 79-89 (1983) for an interesting but dated description. See also CEGB to be Re-
sponsible for Compliance with new Targets to Reduce SO2 Emissions, 11 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 7, at 389-90 (July 13, 1988).
66. 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1988/89 713-15 (25th ed. 1988) [here-
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agreed to freeze nitrogen oxide emissions at 1987 levels by Decem-
ber 31, 1994.17 Nitrogen oxide emissions pose health risks and are
worth controlling for that reason. However, this agreement makes
only a modest contribution toward that goal. Its contribution to
the solution of the acid rain problem is more modest still. In Eu-
rope, the far more important but nettlesome issue of long-range
transport of sulfur dioxide has not been resolved by the states
concerned."
In North America, the subject has been on the agenda of U.S.-
Canadian negotiations for years. To an outside observer, the
Canadians appeared to have the stronger arguments. To be sure,
once fully implemented, the Clean Air Act (CAA) revisions will sig-
nificantly reduce acid rain in Canada." Also promising are the
plans to negotiate a bilateral accord on transborder air pollution.
7 0
However, concrete U.S. steps before the Clean Air Act revisions
consisted primarily of foot dragging, coupled with a modest
amount of research on clean coal technology and an even more
modest (commentators claim highly politicized) National Acid Pre-
cipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP).7 1
Ironically, the most useful measures actually implemented to
date to control sulfur dioxide in North America have been between
inafter YEARBOOK].
67. See Comment, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution:
Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 447, 473 (1989)
(citing the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes,
Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989) [hereinafter Nitrogen Oxide Protocol]).
68. The ECE sponsored an earlier effort to agree on sulfur dioxide reductions, but sev-
eral key countries, including the U.K. (which may be the single worst offender in Western
Europe) refused to become a party. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Trans-
boundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent, July 8, 1985, 27 I.L.M. 707 (1988) [hereinafter
Sulfur Dioxide Protocol]. For all practical purposes, until the British reverse their position,
the Protocol is a virtual dead letter.
69. Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 401-416, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
70. The U.S. and Canada announced that negotiations of a formal air quality agree-
ment between Canada and the U.S. will start Aug. 28, 1990, aiming for a framework to
manage a wide range of transboundary pollution issues. The accord would require the devel-
opment of coordinated research and monitoring programs and would put in place a joint
dispute resolution mechanism. US-Canada Air Quality Talk to Begin in August, Proprie-
tary to United Press Int'l, July 16, 1990 (wire service).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8912 (1988). Originally the NAPAP had a 10 year mandate to
study acid rain. Yet, after eight years and $535 million spent on programs, the Bush Admin-
istration shut it down. Raloff, Mapping the Benefits of Acid-Rain Controls, 138 Scl News
165 (1990). The Congress, however, did not agree and ordered that the NAPAP be contin-
ued, with some modifications. Id.
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the U.S. and Mexico. Concerned with the enormous amounts of
sulfur dioxide expected to be emitted by the new Narozari copper
smelter in Mexico and its potential impacts on the U.S. side of the
border, the U.S. began to press the Mexican government to reduce
emissions. To the considerable embarrassment of the U.S., the
Mexican government pointed out that U.S. smelters, such as the
one in Douglas, Arizona, often deposited excessively high levels of
sulfur dioxide on Mexican territory 2 These excessive emission
levels were continuing because of a special legislative break Con-
gress gave copper smelters, 73 coupled with shamefully inadequate
enforcement actions. This story has a happy ending, however, for
one offending U.S. smelter shut down its operations rather than
undertake the expenditures to lower sulfur dioxide emissions, and
the special congressional break lapsed. At the same time, the Mexi-
can government agreed to lower the emissions from its smelter.
1
Virtually nothing has been done elsewhere to curtail acid pre-
cipitation, because nations believe their level of development does
not warrant action, they believe their country's geography does not
require it, or they simply lack consciousness of the issue.
75 It will
be interesting to see how the problem is handled as it becomes a
political issue in other regions.
D. Pollution of the Marine Environment
The oceans constitute seventy-one percent of the world's sur-
face." Their vastness has led mankind to act as if the marine envi-
ronment has an infinite capacity to absorb pollution, but that is
72. The reader is left with the task of deciding whether American hectoring of other
nations about matters on which the U.S. does not have clean hands is merely a bad habit or
a congenital deformity of the national body politic. In any case, it is a common practice of
the U.S. press, industry, public interest organizations, Congressional members and staff, and
executive branch agencies to indulge in this classic double standard.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 7419(b) (1988) (providing for the issuance of permits to those
smelters that are unable to afford the cost of meeting sulfur dioxide emission limitations in
applicable state plans).
74. See Morris, U.S., Mexico Finally Agree to Cut Copper Smelter Pollution Along
Arizona Border, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 23, 1986, at 6, col. 1; cf. Agreement of Cooperation
Between the U.S. and Mexico Regarding Transboundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper
Smelters Along Their Common Border, Jan. 29, 1987, U.S.-Mexico, 26 I.L.M. 33 (1987).
75. This lack of consciousness does not mean there is no problem. For example, Africa
has ozone pollution and acid rain at levels comparable to industrial countries, largely due to
man-made fires. Simons, High Ozone and Acid-Rain Levels Found Over African Rain For-
ests, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
76. 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 611 (1990).
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certainly not the case for several classes of pollutants. The interna-
tional community has made progress on some marine pollution
problems, while others of potentially greater importance have been
ignored.
1. Oil Spills
One problem which the world community has addressed is oil
spills from tankers." The matter is regulated extensively by do-
mestic law,78 and also by several international agreements.7 9 Ex-
isting domestic and international law are both a blessing and a
curse. These laws are at least partially to blame for the large num-
ber of spills, insofar as they place ceilings on ship owner liability.80
If ship owners become liable for all the harm they cause, they
would have a powerful incentive to shift to the use of vessels and
operating practices inherently less likely to cause spills.8" Unfortu-
nately, adopting such a requirement will not entirely resolve the
77. The risk of spills from oil exploration and exploitation are a major concern, raising
many of the same issues as tanker spills. However, with a few exceptions, these raise domes-
tic or bilateral issues, and will not be further discussed here.
78. There are a number of such provisions in U.S. law, including those at 33 U.S.C. §
407 (1988); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-87 (1988); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-
1524 (1988); and 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1988). In light of the Exxon Valdez incident,
perhaps the best known is 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (1988), which limits tanker owners' liabil-
ity to $14,000,000 for spills incident to transport of oil from the Alaska pipeline, with certain
exceptions, and limits the liability of the special fund created for such spills to $100,000,000.
Needless to say, the Prince William Sound clean-up shows how trivial those limits are when
compared with the damage a major spill can cause. See infra note 81.
79. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970); Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972); 1990 Conven-
tion on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, [Reference File] Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) Supp. No. 103, at 17 (Jan. 1991).
80. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1988) (setting a ceiling of $250,000 dollars in the
case of oil or hazardous materials spill, absent full liability on other grounds); 33 U.S.C. §
1517(d) (1988) (limiting liability for discharge of oil in a deep water port to $20,000,000 or
$150 per gross ton of the polluting vessel, whichever is lesser, except in cases of gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct).
81. In response to the Exxon Valdez and other spills, Congress passed the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). The Act,
while not ideal from the perspective of forcing tanker operators to bear all the risks they
throw on society, does increase the cap on liability to $10,000,000 dollars, with no cap in
cases involving gross negligence or willful misconduct. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, §§ 1004
(a)(1)(B)(i) & (c)(1)(A). More significantly, the Act requires double hulls for tankers by the
year 2010, and allows states to enact laws with even more stringent requirements with re-
spect to liability. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, §§ 1018(c) & 3703(a). For a more thorough
discussion, see Edelman, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
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problem, given the financial weakness of some tanker owners."2
A more far-reaching solution would be to borrow a concept
from U.S. domestic law regulating hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities, which imposes stringent "financial
responsibility" requirements on the owners or operators of such fa-
cilities."8 If states were to reach an international consensus that the
owners, operators, and charterers of petroleum tankers (and per-
haps other classes of ocean-going vessels) demonstrate similar fi-
nancial responsibility before they could use the ports and cross the
territorial waters of a state, the long-standing doctrine of the right
of innocent passage may not become an issue. If several littoral
states adopted this approach, it will be available for any clean-ups
which become necessary and would provide the economically opti-
mal incentive for safety and pollution prevention. Indeed, it would
be far more effective and efficient if the principle were adopted
internationally."4
2. Transport of Hazardous Materials
The safe transport of oil and other petroleum products is still
well beyond our grasp, as evidenced by several spectacular spills
over the past two decades.85 Oddly, the international rules on the
82. Some tanker owners and operators are undercapitalized. Others have acted to limit
their liability by creating separate corporate entities for each ship they own or operate.
83. In order to obtain a license to operate a facility for the storage, treatment, or dispo-
sal of hazardous waste, the owner/operator must prove to the EPA's satisfaction that suffi-
cient financial resources are available, should the facility subsequently be closed and require
corrective action incident to its closure. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(a)(6) & (t) (1988).
84. Some progress on oil spills continues to be made by the international community.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has agreed upon a draft convention foi oil
spill response worldwide (WLR 039/4), designed to promote the establishment of national
response centers and to stockpile equipment and materials needed to cope with major spills.
See IMO Says Oil Pollution Convention Should be Ready for November 1990 Action, 12
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 531 (Nov. 8, 1989); 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, supra note 79. While such actions are better than
nothing, they are not a substitute for holding tanker owners and operators fully liable and
requiring them to post adequate financial security. An international convention to that ef-
fect would guarantee rapid progress while avoiding the greater risks and costs to tanker
operations if individual littoral states impose duplicative or even inconsistent requirements.
85. There is a separate question growing out of the Prince William Sound spill as to
whether there should be better standards for tanker construction and equipment. Whether
the best of today's tankers is good enough to provide the optimal level of environmental
protection is a matter well beyond the author's area of expertise. However, it would be
astonishing if all existing tankers are equally well constructed, equipped, and maintained. If
some tankers are deficient, international minimum standards could be very helpful, pro-
vided they do not preempt the right of individual nations to require more. Congress must
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ocean transportation of hazardous substances other than petro-
leum represent a quiet success for the international community.
Working under the auspices of the IMO,86 international standards
for shipping containers, their storage aboard ship, and their label-
ing and manifesting have been established for a wide variety of
hazardous materials. The IMO's work and similar work on the air
transport of hazardous materials by the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) 87 are sophisticated and well received.
The IMO and ICAO recommendations are routinely accepted by
the competent, national authorities in the U.S. and other
countries.55
3. Plastic Pollution
A marine environmental issue of major concern is the growing
amount of plastic debris. There are several sources of this plastic
pollution. The largest source is the international fishing industry,
which yearly looses untold thousands of kilometers of plastic net
and monofilament line, as well as tens of thousands of plastic crus-
tacean traps. Historically, the fishing industry carried out its activ-
ities with biodegradable materials whose loss posed no long-term
environmental risk. After World War II, the industry shifted to ny-
lon and other non-degradable polymers for nets and traps because
of their durability, strength, and low cost. This trend coincided
with a shift in fishing from small, often local activities to very
large-scale operations involving huge nets, sophisticated fish-locat-
ing techniques, at-sea factory processing, and a world appetite
which grew progressively more voracious even as over-fishing de-
pleted many fishing grounds.
A particularly reckless and irresponsible part of this global
fishing industry uses drift nets to catch its prey. These nets are
often over fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) long. Portions of them
have thought the design of certain vessels was inadequate considering it passed the law
requiring double hulls on those vessels. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 3703(a); see supra note
81 and accompanying text.
86. The IMO formerly went under the name International Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization (IMCO). The IMCO went into effect in 1958. Convention of the Intergovernmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289
U.N.T.S. 3. Currently over 125 nations belong to the IMO.
87. See YEARBooK, supra note 66, at 57.
88. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 954 (1989) (U.S. Department of Transportation adopts ICAO
standards for the safe transport of dangerous goods by air); 50 Fed. Reg. 5781 (1985) (Pan-
ama Canal Commission proposes to adopt standards set forth in various IMO conventions).
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are routinely lost. Because they do not degrade and because they
are of neutral buoyancy, these "ghost nets" go on trapping fish,
whose numbers are thereby depleted without providing benefit to
anyone. These nets also trap marine mammals, turtles, and sea
birds, some of which are endangered species.89 According to one
estimate, over 21,440,000 kilometers (13,292,800 miles) of drift net
are used in the North Pacific annually, and 13,950 kilometers
(8,649 miles) of that net are lost.'0 Even where the nets are not
lost, their use can kill marine mammals."'
Most of the drift net problem is caused by fishing fleets from
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. These nations have argued that
drift nets are highly efficient and that it would be uneconomical for
them to shift to the less environmentally harmful netting and
hooking techniques used by other nations. This argument is
flawed. Technologies which indiscriminately kill endangered spe-
cies and remove from the global commons more fish than can ade-
quately regenerate are not economically efficient.'2 They are rapa-
cious. Use of drift nets is merely a "beggar thy neighbor" act, by
which a few reap enormous gains at the expense of other nations.
Worse yet, because these materials will not degrade for centuries,
89, Such ghost nets are considered the most likely explanation for the continued de-
cline of the North Pacific fur seals. North Pacific Fur Seal-Pribilof Island Population; Des-
ignation as Depleted, 51 Fed. Reg. 47,156, 47,159 (1986). In times past, these seals received
some protection under the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention, whose stated purpose was to
protect future exploitation by setting limits on present takings. See Interim Convention on
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948, 314
U.N.T.S. 105, as amended by 15 U.S.T. 316, T.I.A.S. No. 5558 (1963); 27 U.S.T. 3371,
T.I.A.S. No. 8368 (1976); 32 U.S.T. 5881, T.I.A.S. No. 10020 (1980). That Convention has
now lapsed, and its revival faces stiff opposition from environmental groups. Greater protec-
tion of these seals and other pinnipeds is afforded by the operation of the U.S. Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988). Despite a virtual end to all sealing,
the North Pacific fur seals' numbers continue to decline. The ghost nets (and possibly also
nets in active operation) have a particularly pernicious impact on the intelligent seals, which
may be mistaking the long semi-translucent nets for kelp beds, their natural hunting
grounds. Being naturally curious, they cannot avoid coming into contact with the nets, and
sometimes become entangled and drown.
90. The NMFS estimate published in The Defenders of Wildlife Newsletter by its staff
biologist, Dr. Al Manville (in press).
91. Nets in active use for tuna fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific continue to be the
cause of the greatest marine mammal slaughter on earth. McCarthy, Saving the Elephants:
This Year's Cause, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1989, at A19, col. 5.
92. Expressed in the terms of an economist, the viability of drift net use depends on
uncompensated "externalities" (i.e., drift net users throw costs, which the users should rea-
sonably be expected to bear, onto others in international society). If current drift net fishers
were requiredto compensate the international community for all the costs of their activities
now and for the future costs of their lost nets, the practice would prove to be extremely
uneconomical and would immediately cease.
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if ever, the users of the nets also profit at the expense of future
generations.
Fortunately, there has been progress in dealing with the drift
net problem. The story is a good illustration of how changing inter-
national values can change the behavior of nations. In 1989, under
growing criticism of its practices, South Korea announced its in-
tention to forbid the use of drift nets in the South Pacific tuna
fishery."' On December 22, 1989, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted Resolution 44/225, sponsored by the U.S., Canada, and
other states, calling for a ban on all drift net fishing in the South
Pacific by 1991 and globally by 1992 unless ways can be found to
prevent the harmful effects of drift net fishing. " Japan subse-
quently stated that it would go along with the ban in the South
Pacific pending further research. Then, surprising many environ-
mentalists, Japan announced it would halt drift netting in the
South Pacific for the 1990-91 fishing season, a full year earlier than
required by the U.N. Resolution. Japan's decision followed an an-
nouncement by three major U.S. tuna canners to sell only "dolphin
free" tuna95 and the capture of a dozen Japanese vessels in Soviet
waters trying to disguise themselves as North Korean vessels.96 Ja-
pan's decision came on the eve of the next meeting of the South
Pacific Forum, with whom Japan's stance had become a major po-
litical irritant.0 7 Initially, Taiwan refused to budge, but it has since
told the South Pacific Nations it would not use drift nets for tuna
fishing in the South Pacific next season.s Taiwan also agreed to
allow U.S. observers on its drift net boats, which should provide
93. South Korean Efforts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1989, at 22, col. 5.
94. See Egan, New Evidence of Ecological Damage Brings a Call to Ban Drift-net fish-
ing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at 24, col. 1; Scott, Drift-net Fishing to be Banned in S.
Pacific, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
95. Although the "dolphin free" requirement imposed by Starkist, Bumble Bee, and
Van Camps will affect drift netters, it was aimed primarily at the practice of purse seining.
Tuna: A Tasty Order, Miami Herald, Apr. 18, 1990, at 16A, col. 1. In purse seining, vessels
exploit a unique symbiotic relationship in the South Pacific between yellowfin tuna and
porpoises; for some unknown reason, tuna follow schools of porpoises. Purse seining vessels
will surround schools of porpoises in order to capture the tuna underneath, drowning many
porpoises in the process.
96. Jones, Japan's Fishing Fleet Trims Sails, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 25, 1990 at
4, col. 2.
97. South Pacific Leaders Debate Chemical Weapons Plans, Proprietary to United
Press Int'l, July 29, 1990 (wire service).
98. World in Brief; Japan: Fishing to be Suspended Early, L.A. Times, July 18, 1990,
at A9, col. 1.
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some constraint against the most egregious behavior."
The problem of drift net fishing is still not solved and action is
urgently needed to prevent it in the North Pacific and other ar-
eas.110 If necessary, the littoral nations should agree among them-
selves to forbid access to their ports and passage through their ter-
ritorial waters, keeping in mind the doctrine of the right to
innocent passage to avoid controversy, of any drift net fishing ves-
sel unless the vessel in question can prove it is using only degrad-
able materials. 0 1 The littoral nations should also refuse to import
fish from non-cooperating nations and close their own fishing
grounds to them.'
While the drift net problem has not been completely resolved,
the progress recently achieved should not be taken lightly. It illus-
trates that a combination of changing global norms, good diplo-
macy, and tough domestic legislation can bring about significant
reforms, even where there are powerful economic interests at stake.
Another area where the international community has made
progress in curbing plastic pollution-with far more harmony and
less fanfare-is prohibiting the discard of plastics from merchant
99. See Lachica, Taiwan to Let U.S. Check DriftNet Use in North Pacific, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 28, 1989, at A6, col. 2.
100. The NMFS prohibits the use of drift nets for certain types of fish in the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). 55 Fed. Reg. 14,833 (1990) (final rule Apr. 19, 1990). Taiwanese drift
nets, after presumably leaving the Pacific, are now appearing in the Atlantic Ocean. Stevens,
Large Drift Nets Move to Atlantic, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 1. To keep the
pressure on the Taiwanese drift net fishers in the South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand
military aircraft will patrol the South Pacific during the fishing season in order to spot
fishing boats using the "wall of death" nets. Fighting Drift-Net Fishing, Wall St. J., Nov. 5,
1990, at All, col. 2.
101. Both Australia and New Zealand have announced they will refuse to refuel drift
net fishing vessels. Taiwan to Halt Drift-net Fishing Next Season, Kyodo News Service,
Feb. 21, 1990 (wire service).
102. The U.S. Senate recently voted to ban the use of drift nets more that one mile in
length from U.S. waters and prohibited their use by American fishing fleets anywhere on the
high seas. Gorman, Senate Votes for U.S. Drift-net Ban, Proprietary to United Press Int'l,
Oct. 11, 1990 (wire service). United States law provides that the Secretary of Commerce may
close U.S. fishing grounds to vessels which do not abide by restrictions of the Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1824(12) (1988). Unfortunately, as more fishing grounds
are closed to foreign fleets for other reasons, the threat of this sanction decreases. Neverthe-
less, if all nations closed their fishing grounds to offending nations, the pressure to halt the
practice would be considerable. It might be argued that if they lacked official sanction, the
drift net fishers would increase "pirate" fishing, as has happened with illegal whaling. The
solution to that problem is the same one used to halt piracy and the slave tradq: the naval
ships of any nation should be free to seize or scuttle the vessel in question and place the
officers and crew under arrest. In a rational world, an international agreement to that effect
would be easy to reach.
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marine vessels into any marine waters. Annex V of the MARPOL
Convention has recently come into force. 0 3 It prohibits the dispo-
sal of various classes of garbage near coastlines. Consequently, ves-
sel operators must insure that the garbage is incinerated at sea,
transferred for disposal at port, or disposed of at greater distances
from the shore, where there will be more time for the refuse to
degrade. Of greater importance to the long-range well-being of the
oceans, Annex V imposes a nearly absolute prohibition on the dis-
posal of plastic substances anywhere at sea.1
0 4
While the success of Annex V will depend on vigorous national
enforcement, the entry into force of the agreement is a salutary-if
tardy-accomplishment. This positive step serves to help build the
international consensus against further degradation of the marine
environment and establishes binding requirements that few na-
tions would have imposed unilaterally for fear of placing their
shipping interests at a competitive disadvantage.' 05
4. Sensitive Marine Areas
Effective international environmental protection must address
two marine environments of special concern: areas which are espe-
cially sensitive by their nature (such as estuaries, coral reefs, and
breeding grounds) and areas which have been badly degraded and
are thus in need of special remedial measures. As to the former,
most action to protect estuaries and near-shore areas has been na-
tional, since sovereign states are armed with ample legal authority
103. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2,
1973, Annex V, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 1434 (1973) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1988))
[hereinafter MARPOL Convention].
104. Id. at 1435. The dumping of plastic waste generated by a vessel is forbidden any-
where in the marine environment. The Annex does not address plastic waste generated on
land and dumped at sea, nor does it regulate plastics which reach the sea from rivers,
beaches, or other terrestrial sources.
105. In terms of national compliance, the U.S. has made a commendable beginning by
passing implementing legislation which goes beyond the minimum requirements of the
treaty in several important respects. See MARPOL Convention, supra note 103. The Coast
Guard has also adopted stringent enforcement regulations. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.01-159.205
(1989). Another favorable development has been the unexpected willingness of the U.S.
Navy, working with groups of environmental organizations under the umbrella of the Entan-
glement Coalition, to solve the problem posed by naval warships, which generally have little
or no room for the storage of waste or the safe installation of incinerators. To deal with the
situation, the Navy is investigating changing to degradable materials wherever possible and
installing incinerators on supply ships so that unavoidable waste plastic can be transferred
back during re-supply operations.
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to protect their own shore lines from indigenous pollution. How-
ever, those aspects of Annex V of MARPOL which deal with gar-
bage other than plastics are a useful international supplement to
national authority in protecting shore regions. Little has been done
to protect those uniquely valuable ocean environments which are
not within a nation's territorial sea.
More has been accomplished in designating bodies of water re-
quiring special remedial measures. The UNEP has a special Re-
gional Seas Programme, under which it has designated eleven bod-
ies of water (including the Mediterranean and the Caribbean Seas,
both of which are in deplorable condition) as deserving of special
attention.06 The consequence of the designation is primarily to fo-
cus international attention on the problems of the designated body
of water. Acting under UNEP auspices or, in a few cases, the aus-
pices of regional organizations, an "action plan" is then developed
and occasionally carried out. 0 7 Finally, there are some legal conse-
quences flowing from the designation. For example, under Annex
V, some classes of garbage cannot be released at all from a vessel
into certain specially designated bodies of water.0 8
5. Pollution from On-Shore Sources
An aspect of marine environmental protection about which the
international community has done too little is the protection of the
oceans from terrestrial pollution. The London Dumping Conven-
tion' 0 9 proscribes the offshore ocean disposal of various dangerous
materials. Thus, it is illegal under the Convention to use the
oceans for the disposal of radioactive wastes, as done in the past.110
Nevertheless, there are serious weaknesses in the Convention. Far
greater quantities of undesirable materials are dumped into the
world's oceans than is generally considered prudent. While there
may be a few cases where ocean disposal is the best alternative, 1'
106. See YEARwooK, supra note 66, at 709-10.
107. For a thorough, if somewhat uncritical, overview of the various regional efforts to
control marine pollution, see Edwards, Review of the Status of Implementation and Devel-
opment of Regional Arrangements on Cooperation in Combating Marine Pollution, in IN-
TMNATIONAL EW MONMNTAL DIPLOMACY 229-72 (J.E. Carroll ed. 1988).
108. MARPOL Convention, supra note 103, at 1436.
109. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinaf-
ter London Dumping Convention].
110. Id. at 2465, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, at 62, 1046 U.N.T.S. at 203.
111. There is a body of opinion which holds that some ocean dumping is essential for a
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the oceans should not be used for deliberate disposal of sewage
sludge, garbage, medical waste, industrial waste, and contaminated
soils. In addition to its adverse impact on aesthetics (a non-trivial
consideration since the shore is often exceptionally valuable for
tourism and recreation), ocean dumping can harm public health,
fishing, and other important interests. Unfortunately, there is cur-
rently little international pressure to amend the London Dumping
Convention to forbid such practices.
A separate problem is pollution of the marine environment by
terrestrial sources such as industrial dischargers, sewage treatment
plants, farm and mine run-off, and so forth."' This terrestrial pol-
lution can result directly from discharges to marine waters, indi-
rectly from the discharge of persistent pollutants to fresh water, or
even from the air transport of pollutants.
Beyond question, the vastness of the oceans and their high ox-
ygen content give the oceans a considerable capacity to absorb and
destroy many pollutants. Certainly the open oceans are far more
resilient than other bodies of water, such as rivers, lakes, estuaries,
and bays. The oceans' absorptive capacities, however, are not with-
out limits.
Untreated or inadequately treated sewage is a source of con-
tamination in marine waters adjacent to both developed and devel-
oping countries.11 3 Sewage has historically been thought of as a do-
mestic issue on the theory that the sewage poses a threat to
bathers and shellfish consumers in the country of release but gen-
erally not to persons in other countries, except in areas near inter-
national borders. Nevertheless, as international commerce in sea-
food continues to grow, consumers in one country will need greater
few highly specialized circumstances. For example, in the case of dredged materials from
shipping channels, there is often no satisfactory on-land alternative. Ocean disposal of
dredged materials is clearly not good for the receiving environment. It may, however, be the
least of all possible evils. The issue then becomes how to dump it while minimizing the
adverse consequences by avoiding breeding grounds, shell fishing areas, and other sensitive
spots.
112. For example, tourism in Italy suffered because a carpet of yellowish algae slime
washed up on the shores of the Adriatic Sea. Scientists believe the slime is caused by farm
run-off and sewage pollution of the Po River. Italy Unveils Research Drive into Adriatic
Sea Slime, Reuter Library Report, Sept. 26, 1989 (wire service).
113. A new UNEP study reported serious health problems from the discharge of sew-
age, both to exposed bathers and from eating contaminated seafood, which can cause gastro-
intestinal diseases and infectious hepatitis. see Johnson, Oceans Threatened by Develop-
ment, Proprietary to United Press Int'l, Mar. 20, 1990 (wire service) (discussing the State of
the Marine Environment (UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 115)).
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assurance that the seafood they import from other countries does
not carry diseases from sewage discharges."
Toxic substances are another category of pollutant posing
risks for the marine environment. Of primary concern are those
toxic chemicals which are highly persistent (i.e., resistant to degra-
dation) or highly capable of bioconcentration, 1 65 and especially
those which are both. Included in this last category are certain
heavy metals and their organic compounds,"' such as methylated
mercury and organo-tin compounds. These can be toxic to aquatic
organisms even in low concentrations of parts per trillion. 117 Also
included are several non-degradable or very slowly degrading pesti-
cides, such as DDT." s A few classes of industrial chemicals (e.g.,
polychlorinated biphenyls or PCBs) and by-products from indus-
trial production (e.g., chlorinated dioxyns and dibenzofurans) also
114. Domestic law commonly gives governmental authorities the power to preclude the
importation and sale of tainted fish and shellfish. However, inspection and testing resources
are so limited as to make it better practice to establish that the seafood was not taken from
tainted waters. There are no international conventions which assure this outcome.
115. Bioconcentration is a process by which substances enter into aquatic organisms
through the gills or by ingestion. The aquatic organism, over time, builds up a higher con-
centration of the foreign substance within its flesh than is present in the surrounding water.
See Tharpes, International Environmental Law: Turning the Tide on Marine Pollution, 20
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 579, 587 n.48 (1989).
116. Toxic metals present a particularly severe disposal problem, since they are ele-
ments and cannot be destroyed. However, they can be isolated or transformed into relatively
less toxic forms.
117. Mercury, in addition to causing serious adverse human health effects, is considered
a potential toxic risk to aquatic organisms in saline waters in concentrations above 25 parts
per trillion. Ambient Water Quality Criteria Document, 1984 (Mercury), EPA 440/5-84-026
(Jan. 1985). Organic compounds of tin, such as tributyl-tin (TBT), are used in paints on
ocean going vessels to prevent a build-up of barnacles. Tributyl-tin is toxic to fish at 0.2
parts per billion (ppb); bivalves at 0.02 to 0.05 ppb; gastropods at 0.05 ppb; crustaceans at
0.14 to 0.19 ppb; and algae at 0.1 to 2.5 ppb. Scientists have found at least 30 sites in the
U.S. with TBT concentrations of 0.02 ppb or above. See 53 Fed. Reg. 39,025 (1988).
118. Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane was once used worldwide as a broad spectrum
insecticide and is still used in some developing countries. Originally thought to be non-toxic
to humans, it is now considered a carcinogen. Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane is unusu-
ally capable of bioconcentrating. Organisms can build the level of DDT in their bodies to
amounts much higher than the levels to which they were exposed. In the case of DDT, this
is particularly severe, because it goes through many steps in the food chain, with its concen-
tration increasing greatly at each step. Graham, DDT Is Alive and Well, AUuBoN, Nov.
1984, at 36. The end result in the U.S. was concentrations of DDT in eagles, falcons, and
other birds of prey which were so high as to interfere with their reproduction. Peregrine
falcons and bald eagles were threatened with extinction because of the use of DDT.
Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane itself will degrade slowly, but its degradation products
(metabolites) are themselves highly toxic and capable of bioconcentrating. Researchers have
found DDT and its metabolites virtually everywhere, including trace quantities in the tis-
sues of all humans.
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meet the three critical tests of being toxic, highly persistent, and
capable of bioconcentrating to a high degree. Their release any-
where could pose risks to human health and the environment at
very great distances from the point of release." 9
We need an international agreement that prohibits the manu-
facture, use, and release of such substances, whether heavy metals,
pesticides, or industrial chemicals. Where this is not feasible, the
convention should alternatively establish use restrictions and dis-
posal practices which minimize the risk that the substances would
build-up globally. To date, there has been virtually no progress on
this score. 1'2 0 Indeed, scientists are conducting relatively little re-
search as to what substances are building up in the global
environment.
E. Deforestation and Desertification
Overpopulation has combined with poor forestry and agricul-
tural practices to bring about major changes in the global land-
scape, virtually always for the worse. Massive losses of timbered
areas to agriculture and commercial logging, subsistence scaveng-
ing for firewood, and conversion of farm and pasture lands into
desert are currently taking place.
The loss of tropical rain forest is especially severe in the Ama-
zon Basin and in Southeast Asia. Clearing land for agriculture and
commercial logging are the primary culprits.' 2' Slash-and-burn ag-
riculture presents a particularly problematic issue in tropical rain
forests such as the Amazon for three reasons. First, these lands
often provide invaluable habitat. If lost, numerous species will be-
119. Of course, such substances are most likely to be of concern to the state which uses
and releases them, since its citizens and the environment within its borders are the most
likely victims. Nevertheless, these substances can be transported to other locations, bringing
about adverse effects in foreign countries, thereby making their release a proper matter of
international concern.
120. The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources,
Feb. 21, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 352 (1974), recognizes the criteria of persistence, toxicity, and ten-
dency to bioconcentrate as particularly important. Unfortunately, only twelve European
countries and the EC are parties to the Convention. Additionally, its geographic coverage is
limited to the northeastern part of the Atlantic. While the Convention has done useful work
on mercury and cadmium, it is otherwise a dead letter. Largely hortatory and ineffective,
this Convention is emphatically not a model for a global agreement.
121. Clearing for large-scale ranching is the primary cause of deforestation in some
tropical countries. See Venant, Drama in the Amazon, L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at El, col.
2.
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come extinct or endangered. Second, since tropical rain forests
make a vital contribution to the removal of carbon dioxide from
the atmosphere, their loss exacerbates the global warming problem.
Third, the burning of the cleared vegetation adds to the amount of
atmospheric carbon dioxide.
On the other hand, slash-and-burn agriculture rarely makes a
sustainable contribution to economic growth. The cleared timber,
though often valuable, is frequently not harvested because of inad-
equate equipment and transportation. Moreover, soils in tropical
rain forests are typically poor, and use of the land to raise crops
quickly depletes the soil. Frequently, the land is abandoned after
approximately five years and reverts slowly back to jungle.12 With-
out human assistance, the land cannot become productive rain for-
est again for decades."'
Although the trade-off between economic benefit and environ-
mental protection is exceptionally poor even in the short run, 2"
halting slash-and-burn agriculture will be very difficult. The farm-
ers in question often have no money or possessions, and thus noth-
ing to lose and something to gain. Most often they are squatters,
clearing a space on public land or large estates on which to scratch
out a living. Their conduct is thus already illegal. Use of more re-
pressive methods to prevent their activities will greatly increase
122. See Ware, Sucres or Cecropias, AUDUBON, Jan. 1985, at 30.
123. The situation is even worse when cleared land has been used for large-scale pas-
ture land. Once abandoned, the land may take centuries to become tropical rainforest again
unless there is human intervention. For a discussion of the problems and the potential for
reforestation, see D. Nepstad, C. Uhl, & E. Serrdo, Surmounting Barriers to Forest Regen-
eration in Abandoned, Highly Degraded Pastures: A Case Study from Paragominas, Pard,
Brazil, in ALTERNATrrzS TO DEPORESTATION 215 (A.B. Anderson ed. 1990).
124. It is chic in some circles in developed countries to reject the concept of a trade-off
between economic growth and protection of the environment. Even in these countries,
trade-offs cannot be avoided, but often the conflict is not particularly severe, and environ-
mental and economic interests can readily coexist. Annual expenditures for environmental
protection in developed countries, while enormous, are still a very small fraction of their
gross national products (GNPs). These costs are partially recovered by tangible benefits of
environmental protection, particularly medical expenses avoided and lost work time forgone.
Intangible benefits to the quality of life more than justify these modest net costs.
The balance may be quite different in developing countries. The funds available for the
environment are limited and the same level of environmental expenditures would constitute
a dramatically higher percentage of the GNP. Moreover, some of the genuine benefits of
environmental measures in the developed countries may be less compelling in the context of
a developing country. For example, a developing country with a low average life expectancy
might conclude that reducing the incidence of cancer from environmental exposure is a rela-
tively low priority if expenditures on agricultural production, population control, or disease
eradication would save more lives than would expending the same amount to reduce expo-
sure to carcinogens.
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human suffering. Quick solutions do not exist. In the long run,
halting population growth and providing greater economic oppor-
tunities elsewhere in these societies will help. Yet, these are al-
ready key goals of most developing countries, the attainment of
which they often find elusive.
Logging of tropical hardwoods is the primary cause of defores-
tation in Southeast Asia and is an important problem in the Ama-
zon. Demand from developed countries makes tropical hardwood
logging profitable. 12 5 Two aspects of the logging problem merit spe-
cial mention. First, the international financial institutions
were-and to some extent still are-a part of the problem, rather
than a part of the solution. They have financed logging operations
or the infrastructure for logging, with little or no prior assessment
of the immediate and long-range environmental effects. They have
generally not required the recipient countries to lessen the envi-
ronmental impact during timbering operations, nor have they re-
quired scientific replanting as a condition of assistance. 2 The
World Bank has been the target of widespread criticism for its en-
vironmental failures. In response to the resulting pressure from
Western governments, the IBRD created an Environment Depart-
ment. 12 7 Its efforts to date have gotten mixed reviews."'8 On the
other hand, the record of the Asian Development Bank'2 9 and the
Inter-American Development Bank'80 in accelerating the loss of
tropical rain forests may be even worse than that of the World
Bank (whose failures have been greater in the areas of industry,
mining, and energy projects). These regional banks have done
nothing of note to remedy the situation and are important causes
of global environmental degradation.' 81 Having said that, the recip-
ient governments have also done very little to minimize adverse
impacts and assure adequate replanting, a failure they cannot
blame entirely on market demand or imprudent lending by the in-
125. In contrast to slash-and-burn agriculture, logging at least presents short-term eco-
nomic benefits. See Booth, Saving Rain Forests by Using Them: Long-Term Harvesting of
Amazon Yields More Profit, Experts Say, Wash. Post, June 29, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
126. See Grieves, Poverty as Pollution, FoRmEs, Nov. 14, 1988, at 204.
127. See Holden, World Bank Launches New Environmental Policy, 236 ScMrca 769
(1987).
128. See, e.g., Schwartz, Global Warming Singes World Bank, Wash. Post, Sept. 12,
1989, at A26, col. 1.
129. See YEAwooK, supra note 66, at 811.
130. Id. at 853.
131. See, e.g., Bank Balance: Economy and Ecology, 132 Sc. NEws 238 (1987).
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ternational financial institutions.13 2
Deforestation in the rest of Asia and in Africa has some of the
same causes, but is characterized primarily by the gathering of
wood for fuel. Real progress on this problem will be difficult, given
ever rising population pressures. As with the problem of slash-and-
burn agriculture, the "perpetrators" are often among the, planet's
most impoverished people, who need wood for building, cooking,
and heating-in short, for their literal survival. They will not halt
the cutting of trees so as to benefit future generations or to avoid
global warming. Nevertheless, the situation is not hopeless, given
enough international political will. s For example, pilot programs
in Nepal3 4 (which has a particularly severe deforestation problem)
and Kenya"33 have demonstrated that even very poor people will
take an active role in replanting and preserving trees if conditions
are favorable for them to do so. Specifically, they need an owner-
ship interest in the trees, adequate technical and financial assis-
tance, and an alternative source of fuel for a period of years while
the trees grow. India, for example, has invented more efficient
wood stoves which can be built at prices affordable in the Third
World.'3e Because nearly all the heat value from wood heating and
cooking stoves currently used throughout the developing world is
wasted, widespread use of more efficient stoves would bring about
sharp reductions in the demand for wood.
137
132. There are, of course, U.S. and European environmental organizations which would
like to see all timbering operations in the tropics halted. They are correct in pointing out
that there are significant differences between tropical and temperate forests, the former be-
ing far more important as habitats. Moreover, because of their greater rate of growth, tropi-
cal rain forests are more important for the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Nevertheless, the implicit premise that developed nations can continue to obtain economic
benefits from their forests but developing countries cannot is politically unpalatable to de-
veloping countries.
133. See Grieves, supra note 126.
134. See Claiborne, Erosion Is Laying Waste to Life in Shadow of the Himalayas,
Wash. Post, July 18, 1983, at A15, col. 1.
135. The Green Belt Movement began in Kenya during 1977. For every tree that sur-
vives more than three months outside the nursery, the woman who planted it receives 50
Kenya cents (approximately 2.5 American cents). More than 10 million indigenous trees
have been planted and the movement has spread to more than 30 other African countries.
Perlez, Skyscraper's Foe Draws a Daily Dose of Scorn, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989 at 6, col. 1.
136. See Dutt, India: Popularizing a Smokeless Stove that Could Spare Forests, Inter
Press Service, Jan. 7, 1986 (wire service).
137. See Energy: A New Era, Au. BANKER, Oct. 7, 1981, at 23; Brooke, Some Gains in
West Africa's War on the Desert, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987, at 22, col. 2 (Burkina Faso,
which deforests 230 square miles per year but replants about 85 square miles per year, now
actively promotes energy-efficient stoves).
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An equally tragic problem is desertification, the conversion of
productive crop and pasture land to non-productive desert. The
U.N. estimates that .96 million hectares (2.4 million acres) of pro-
ductive land are lost each year. 138 There are many causes including
long-term climatic changes.' 9 A key contemporary cause is over-
grazing, particularly in the Sahel region of Africa.140 The victims of
desertification are also the perpetrators: nomadic tribes, sometimes
turned villagers, eking out a marginal existence during the best of
times. Twice in less than two decades there has been a major
drought in the Sahel,' leading to extensive and expensive rescue
efforts on the part of more fortunate nations to halt widespread
starvation. Yet, with reduced pasture land, each family has a
strong incentive in better years to increase the size of its herd,
which brings about further desertification. 4 '
There are plant species which effectively hold moisture, and
their widespread planting and a period of respite from grazing
might actually reverse the trend, reclaiming useful land from the
desert. However, it is difficult to see how such a program could be
carried out on a sufficient scale without massive resources, which
the Sahelian nations lack.143 Such resources seem unlikely to be
forthcoming: to date generous Western publics and their govern-
ments have opened up their hearts and pocket-books to alleviate
starvation, but not to prevent its causes. 144 Additionally, political
strife, including wars or insurrections in or involving Mali, Mauri-
138. Spotts, 10 Years Later: No Plan to Halt Spreading Deserts, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, Feb. 25, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
139. For example, much of the existing Sahara desert was arable land two thousand
years ago. See A. GRAINGER, DESERTIFICATION 37 (1982).
140. The Sahel is a region south of the Sahara desert but north of the coastal jungles of
West Africa, running in a band from Mauritania and Mali on the West Coast of the Atlantic
eastward to Ethiopia and Somalia on the Red Sea. The worst desertification problem may
be in Mauritania, where the desert advances about six kilometers (3.72 miles) a year. Black-
burn, Death of a Culture?, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 9, 1987, at 24, col. 1.
141. Variations on a Pacific Theme, 131 Sci. NEws 377 (1987).
142. Cf. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1244, 1244-45 (1968).
143. It is possible that genetic engineering will allow development of drought resistant
crops which can thrive in low-moisture regions like the Sahel. Bioengineers' Quest:
Drought-Safe Plants, Wash. Post, July 23, 1990, at A3, col. 1. Whether these will be success-
ful without creating serious side effects, and affordable by Sahelian nations remains to be
seen.
144. See A. GRAINoa, supra note 139, at 39-52. In 1977, 94 nations met in Nairobi,
under UNEP auspices, and agreed to an ambitious plan to halt desertification by the end of
the century. The results are mixed. Certainly, far more land has been lost than reclaimed in
the past decade. See, e.g., Brooks, New Famine Sweeps Ethiopia as Civil War Keeps Tak-
ing its Toll, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
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tania, Burkino Faso, Chad, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia have
made the environmental problems dramatically worse.145
F. Protection of Endangered and Threatened Species
Lacking fangs, horns, and claws, humans might not have
seemed a likely candidate for ascendancy over other species a mil-
lion years ago, or even 10,000 years ago. Yet we long ago reached
the point where most animals pose no threat to us, and those
which still do are microbes and vermin, not ferocious beasts. To-
day our own numbers and activities have become a threat to many
species.1
In the past two centuries, species commonly disappeared by
reason of over-hunting and over-fishing. More recently, pollution
and destruction of habitat have become the primary causes of spe-
cies extinction. It is no exaggeration to say that we have become (if
we were not all along) the stewards of the planet, with the capacity
and the obligation to determine whether our fellow creatures sur-
vive.147 Of course, there are homocentrics who believe the measure
of any action is its impact on our own species. For them, there are
ample utilitarian bases for concern over widespread further loss of
species, many of which may prove useful to our well-being or even
essential to our survival. 48
1. The Convention on the International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Governments that want to protect endangered species have
learned that preventing poaching is impossible unless the market
for them dries up. To that end, world governments Concluded the
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 49 which forbids international
145. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 144.
146. See, e.g., White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203
(1967).
147. See A. LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNrYv ALMANAC (1974).
148. To cite but one example, genetic diversity assures us the capacity to adjust to
climate change, such as might be brought on by global warming. For any given set of condi-
tions, there is a plethora of species which could fill the ecological niches brought on by
change. It has taken millions of years to build up this vast genetic pool; we are fools if we
throw it away.
149. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES].
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commerce in endangered species or products from them.1""
While CITES is invaluable, 5" its procedures for designating
species as endangered are cumbersome. There is no international
investigative force which could aid in locating and exposing viola-
tions, and membership in CITES is not universal.'
Even among the CITES parties, the willingness and resources
necessary to engage in vigorous enforcement vary considerably.
Enthusiasm is greatest in those developing countries which recog-
nize that the protection of certain large game species serves to en-
hance tourism and among the conservation-conscious public of
some developed countries, especially in North America and North-
ern Europe.
The case of the African elephant shows that, under the right
circumstances, real international progress is possible. Widespread
publicity on the plight of the African elephant, coupled with some
adept diplomacy, led CITES to list that species as endangered.
The listing alone would not have been enough, but combined with
the action of several nations to halt ivory imports'"3 and the coura-
geous efforts of the Kenyan government to battle poaching,' 5 '
150. For a recent and very thorough discussion of CITES, see D. FAvRE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE TO CITES (1989).
151. CITES is not the only international agreement whose purpose is to protect terres-
trial species from excessive exploitation. See, e.g., Convention on the Conservation of Migra-
tory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 15. Bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments to protect waterfowl, such as the U.S.-Canadian agreement, were among the first uses
of international law to aid conservation. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in
United States and Canada, Aug. 16, 1916, United States-Canada, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No.
628. The 1902 European Convention concerning the Conservation of Birds Useful to Agri-
culture was apparently the first such agreement at the multilateral level. See L.K. Caldwell,
Beyond Environmental Diplomacy, in INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL DPLOMACy 17-18
(J.E. Carroll ed. 1988).
152. Mexico is a particularly unfortunate holdout from membership, as it is responsible
for the harvesting of many endangered sea turtles. Hair, U.S. Leverage Can Halt Destruc-
tion of Sea Turtles, San Francisco Chron., May 29, 1990, at A19, col. 1. However, some
sources conclude the Mexicans have done a good job of protecting the turtle nesting grounds
at Rancho Nuevo. Abramson, Shrimp Boats Kills 44,000 Turtles, Scientists Say, L.A.
Times, May 18, 1990, at A20, col. 1.
153. See Perlez, Ivory Trade Is Banned To Save the Elephant, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1989, at C13, col. 2. China recently announced that it will join the worldwide ban on the
trade of ivory next January. Since Hong Kong's reservation from CITES lapsed in mid-July,
China has been the only country officially permitting the import of ivory. McCarthy, China
Closes Last Ivory Loophole, Times (London), Sept. 6, 1990, at 24, col. 4. The price of ivory
in East Africa has plummeted since the trading ban went into effect. Id.
154. See Henry, Kenya Burns Tusks To Dramatize Effort To Wipe Out Ivory Trade,
Wash. Post, July 19, 1989, at A19, col. 1. Kenya burned tons of captured ivory and issued
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there is greater cause for optimism than many would have pre-
dicted only three years ago. One can only hope that this success
will stimulate even greater international efforts to strengthen the
protection of endangered species through CITES.'
2. Habitat Protection
Efforts to protect endangered species have also taken the form
of preserving unique habitats. In contrast to fighting deforestation
generally, international efforts to preserve the habitats of specific
endangered species have been successful in several important
cases, even though the rate of extinction has been rapidly increas-
ing. Perhaps the best known of these efforts has been the World
Wildlife Fund's (WWF) Project Panda, created to preserve the for-
est habitat of the Great Pandas."'6 Also of note have been the ef-
forts of the African Wildlife Foundation and the WWF to preserve
the home ranges of gorillas and chimps.
1 5 7
Despite these individual successes, unless the protection of
particular species becomes a far higher priority for the interna-
tional community, many more species will be lost.15 8 Governments
need to acknowledge their obligation to preserve critical habitats,
and developed countries must agree to make the resources availa-
ble to less wealthy governments. Even then, acceleration of the loss
of specific endangered species may be inevitable because of severe
human population pressures in the vicinity of many critical
habitats.
"shoot to kill" orders to combat well-armed poachers. For a discussion of conservation and
preventive efforts in Africa, see Jones, Farewell to Africa, AuDUtoN, Sept. 1990, at 49.
155. Some environmentalists fear that the ban on elephant ivory will increase demand
for walrus tasks, endangering that species, unless it is also included in the ban. Cousteau,
Ivory Hunters Raise Sights at The Eskimo and the Walrus, Miami Herald, Oct. 1, 1989, at
3C, col. 4. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Forensics Laboratory is currently investigating who
may have killed and mutilated hundreds of walruses in Alaska. It is thought that some
Eskimos sold the raw ivory. Knickerbocker, On the Trail of Wildlife Crime, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Sept. 11, 1990, at 12, col. 2.
156. See Miller, The Perils of Pandas: Where Has all the Bamboo Gone?, 125 Scl
Nzws 52 (1984).
157. See McBee, Great Apes Get New Lease on Life, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 9,
1986, at 74.
158. A number of nations have engaged in purely domestic efforts to preserve unique
environments, such as the efforts of the Indian government to preserve the last remaining
domestic habitats of the Bengal tiger and three species of crocodile. See Saving India's
Wildlife, FuTuRisT, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 43-44.
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3. Marine Mammal Protection
Different issues are raised by efforts to protect marine mam-
mals. While the preservation of species from extinction per se is
still the primary goal, some organizations pressing for the preserva-
tion of whales and other cetaceans wish to prevent killing individu-
als of the species even where the species is not endangered or
threatened. The reasoning, to the extent it is articulated, is partly
ethical-since the marine mammals as a class are very intelligent,
it is inappropriate to kill them. 15 Whatever the motives, interna-
tional legal protection of marine mammals, while incomplete, has
gone much further than the international protection of most ter-
restrial animals. Important among these efforts is the work of the
International Whaling Commission (IWC), 60 which sets limits on
the taking of whales. The original purpose of the IWC was to foster
whaling by preventing short-term over-whaling. By the 1970s, the
IWC shifted to a more preservationist stance. Nevertheless, these
efforts have been only partially successful, largely because of the
attitude of the Japanese government, which has tried to maintain
an economically marginal whaling industry by all possible means,
including a fraudulent "research whaling" program.1"'
The Law of the Sea Convention also contained a very helpful
provision on whaling."'2 However, invoking the Convention has
159. Others concerned about whaling oppose killing non-endangered species on the
pragmatic grounds that only a categorical ban can be enforced; and, if non-endangered spe-
cies are allowed to be taken, then, in practice, other species which are threatened or endan-
gered will be taken as well.
160. For a brief overview of the IWC and its activities, see Synopsis, Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of the Sea 1984-1985, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 701, n.94 (1986).
161. See Conrad, Save the Whales! Japan Would Kill Hundreds of them for "Re-
search," Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1988, at A21, col. 1. Japan is by far the least protective nation
on whaling issues (as on many other international environmental matters), but the list of
generally unhelpful nations includes Iceland, Norway and, in the recent past, the Soviet
Union. In addition, there is some "pirate" whaling, most of it out of Taiwan. These ships do
not have the official sanction of their government (though it strains credulity that they
could operate without at least tacit governmental support). As discussed supra note 102,
their activities should be treated the same as would be accorded pirates (i.e., any naval
vessel of any nation should be free to bring their activities to a halt).
162. One of the author's colleagues relates that while the Law of the Sea Convention
was under negotiation, Ambassador Elliot Richardson, then head of the U.S. Delegation,
became interested in the plight of whales and put considerable efforts into obtaining inter-
national agreement on what became Article 65. United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 65, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1282 (1982). When agreement was finally
reached, Richardson called a news conference to announce the accomplishment, of which he
was justifiably proud. The senior international reporter for one of the major U.S. newspa-
pers, upon hearing what had been agreed, exclaimed: "Oh Elliot! Is that all? Nobody gives a
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been hampered by the decision of the U.S. (which was the driving
force behind the provision) not to accede to the Convention.
To date, legal measures to protect marine mammals other
than whales, such as porpoises and seals, have been accomplished
largely under domestic law. For example, the NMFS refuses to al-
low the importation of tuna unless the tuna are taken under cir-
cumstances which prevent widespread killing of porpoises. " ' While
many tuna fleets have cooperated with the U.S. rather than lose
the right to export to the U.S. market,164 an international agree-
ment to minimize the incidental taking of porpoises would greatly
improve the situation. Similarly, the Marine Mammal Protection
Act "' has considerably reduced the taking of some classes of pin-
nipeds 66  but international protection would be far more
desirable.'
4. Preserving Genetic Diversity
In theory, there is no difference between the preservation of
genetic diversity and the preservation of endangered species. In
practice, there are important differences in outlook, method, and
emphasis. The protection of endangered species has focused on
preventing the extirpation of specific species, especially very large
mammals and other species which are exotic, magnificent, or cute
and whose demise would be an emotional loss. The focus on ge-
netic diversity, in contrast, begins with the premise that nature has
developed an extraordinary array of combinations of genetic mate-
rial, which should be preserved for ethical reasons and because
many species or their individual genes have extraordinary utility
for crops, pharmaceuticals, and other purposes. The species of in-
damn about whales." It is a measure of rapid changes in international consciousness that a
similar reaction today would be highly unlikely.
163. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 39,743 (1988), action by the NMFS barring the importation
of yellowfin tuna from Ecuador, Panama, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
164. The U.S. government's efforts were greatly strengthened when three major U.S.
tuna canners announced they will accept only "dolphin free" tuna. See supra note 93.
165. See supra note 87.
166. Pinnipeds include seals, sea lions, and walruses. 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 118
(1990).
167. Existing international law has-provided some protection, such as the listing of
some manatees and seals under CITES. See CITES, supra note 149, 27 U.S.T. at 1122,
T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 35, 993 U.N.T.S. at 259. Seals and porpoises also benefit from the
recent Annex V ban on marine dumping of plastics from vessels. See MARPOL Convention,
supra note 103. See also the discussion of drift nets, supra notes 89-102 and accompanying
text.
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terest from this perspective are often plants, but also include fungi,
insects, and other unlovable organisms.
Habitat preservation is the primary solution to this prob-
lem.168 Certain tropical rain forests are particularly important be-
cause of the extraordinary genetic diversity they contain and the
many unique species that have established ecological niches in
those habitats. Unfortunately, the Brazilian government has taken
offense at some of the external pressures which have been brought
to bear upon the government to preserve rainforests in the Amazon
basin. This was a predictable reaction and one which could proba-
bly have been avoided with a modicum of diplomacy and tact. Bra-
zilian feeling was so strong on this issue that the Brazilian govern-
ment sought and obtained a resolution of the parties to the 1978
Amazon Pact Treaty'"9 condemning the "interference."' 170 Mean-
while, other governments have done far more to preserve unique
tropical environments, including some countries in a much less
favorable economic and financial position to do so than Brazil.
171
168. In addition, efforts of zoos and seed-banks to preserve genetic material for the
future could be seen as a part of the overall approach. See Shell, Seeds in the Bank Could
Stave Off Disaster on the Farm, SMITHSONIAN, Jan. 1990, at 94; see also Note, Genetic Ark:
A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversity for Future Generations, 40 STAN. L. REv. 279
(1987).
169. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1045 (1978).
170. See It's Our Forest To Burn if We Want To, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1989, at 42
(hereinafter It's Our Forest]. This is not to suggest that there is merit to the charges of
several Brazilian politicians that the effort to halt the destruction of the forests is an inter-
national plot to steal Brazilian resources. See Simons, Brazil, Smarting from the Outcry
over the Amazon, Charges Foreign Plot, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at A14, col. 1. Never-
theless, it was the silliest kind of political naivete on the part of the U.S., French, and other
critics of the Brazilian government not to have anticipated a xenophobic reaction. Many
Brazilians are engaged in a rapidly growing indigenous effort to protect the environment.
They have made progress despite the clumsiness of their foreign "friends." Furthermore,
several of the problems Brazilian environmentalists face are not susceptible to easy resolu-
tion, as can be seen by 'the killing of Francisco Mendes, a leading Brazilian environmentalist
and Indian rights spokesman, apparently at the hands of ranching interests. See It's Our
Forest, supra.
171. Rwanda, one of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, has set aside literally
10 percent of its land as a national park, in order to preserve a unique ecosystem. See
Perlez, Wildlife Park Seeks New Species: Tame Tourists, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1988, at A4,
col. 2. Another example of far-sighted leadership is Costa Rica whose Guanacaste park pre-
serves numerous unique species. See Holden, Regrowing a Dry Tropical Forest, 234 ScIENcE
809 (1986). In a few cases, debt swaps have been used to support or establish wildlife pre-
serves. For example, the WWF purchased, at a substantial discount, one million dollars of
Ecuador's foreign debt held by commercial lenders. The debt was converted by the Central
Bank of Ecuador into local currency bonds held by Fundacion Natura, Ecuador's leading
private conservation organization. See $1 Million Debt-For-Nature Swap Accord with Ec-
uador Made by World Wildlife Fund, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 31 (Jan. 13,
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G. International Commerce in Pesticides, Toxic Materials,
and Hazardous Waste
1. Pesticides
A particularly contentious issue, split largely along North-
South lines, is the continued willingness of developed countries to
allow their companies to sell pesticides, banned from use at home,
to developing countries. The developed countries have argued that
the problem is one which is entirely within the authority of the
developing countries to resolve, as they are under no obligation to
allow any particular pesticides into their country. Moreover, sev-
eral developed countries, by law or practice, notify developing
countries of the shipment of pesticide substances which cannot be
used in the country of manufacture 172 and provide developing
countries with information when pesticides lose their eligibility for
domestic use.1"3
Developing countries consider these actions insufficient. They
would like to see, at a minimum, a requirement for prior consent
(as opposed to notification) and an international registry of the
toxicological properties of pesticide substances. Such measures
should not be necessary, and by engendering delay, may be an im-
pediment to commerce. But they are hardly a serious blow to the
legitimate interests of pesticide-exporting countries. For that rea-
son, most developed countries have been willing to accommodate
the developing countries, but the U.S. refused. This refusal was
short-sighted and should be reversed in the interest of fostering a
climate for greater cooperation on other issues.
17
4
There are those (primarily in the U.S.) who would like to go
even further and forbid the export of pesticides which are not li-
1988). It remains to be seen how widespread the opportunities will be to trade sovereign
debt in favor of greater wildlife and habitat protection, particularly given the desire of many
developing countries to use such debt swaps for other worthwhile purposes such as educa-
tion, health, and development projects. See Whitefield, Banks 'Donate' Bad Debt, Miami
Herald, Sept. 3, 1989 at 1F, col. 5.
172. See, e.g., Section 17(a) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973, 995 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y,
136o(a) (1988)) (requiring notice prior to export) [hereinafter FIFRAI. The Commission of
the EC has proposed an export notification program conforming to the UNEP and the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommendations. See S.
JOHNSON & G. CORCELLE., THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNITIES 213-
15 (1989).
173. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136o(b) (1988).
174. See infra parts V & VI.
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censed for use in the producing-country, even if the recipient coun-
try urgently needs them. Two rationales are put forward for such a
ban. First, on occasion, food containing residues of banned pesti-
cides has entered the U.S. market-the so-called "circle of poison."
Secondly, it is asked, how we can ethically expose less fortunate
peoples to pesticides we have banned?
Neither of these arguments is convincing after careful analysis.
As to the first, the U.S. government has the legal authority to pre-
vent such incidents by barring the importation of goods with resi-
dues above allowed limits. What the government lacks, however, is
is enough qualified inspectors. 175 Still, if the U.S. were the sole
supplier of the pesticides found in the imported food, there might
be some merit to such a ban. In fact, the pesticides banned in the
U.S. but sold abroad are also manufactured in other developed
countries, and in some cases in developing countries. Without a
worldwide ban on production, a U.S. ban on exports would accom-
plish nothing. Indeed, it could encourage U.S. companies or their
affiliates to produce the same pesticides abroad. As to the ethics
rationale, unsolicited paternalism does not sit well with developing
countries, many of which have made sound decisions that the ben-
efit-to-harm ratio of a particular pesticide in their country is
higher than it is in the U.S.' 76 Few developing countries favor such
a ban, though there is virtual unanimity that the U.S. is not doing
enough short of a ban.
1 7
7
A better solution to the global control of pesticides would have
three elements. First, an internationally-binding agreement is
needed on notification, prior consent, and information require-
ments largely along the lines desired by developing countries. Sec-
175. See Ingersoll, Gone Bad: Tide of Imported Food Outruns FDA Ability to Spot
Contamination, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
176. The FIFRA is a cost-benefit statute. See 7 U.S.C §§ 136a(c)(5)(C) & (D) (1988).
Pesticides can maintain their registration if the benefits (not counting the benefits of sales
to the producing company) exceed the harm. It takes no great imagination to see that, even
under U.S. legal doctrines, the balance might legitimately be drawn differently in another
country. The problem a given pesticide is intended to address (malaria, for example) might
not exist in developed countries or the harm from the pesticide's use in the developed coun-
try may be more severe than it would be in the developing country because of differences in
life expectancy, climate, soil types, and other factors. The opposite may also be the case. For
example, a pesticide considered, on balance, beneficial in the U.S. may not be appropriate
for a particular developing country. Pesticide export controls which are based exclusively on
whether a pesticide is registered for use in the U.S. can thus be either overly protective or
insufficiently protective of the interests of the developing countries.
177. In any event the U.S. Congress just rejected a proposed ban. Gugliotta, Farm Pact
Cuts Outlays 25 Percent, Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
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ondly, there should be a categorical ban on pesticides which pose a
threat to the global commons, or where that is not feasible, the
most stringent possible restrictions on their use. Third, concerned
international organizations and developed countries need to ex-
pand assistance to developing countries for alternatives to the
heavy use of chemical pesticides. 817  The alternatives include
greater use of biological control measures/7s greater use of pher-
imones and other non-lethal control approaches,' 80 and crop rota-
tion. These methods do not eliminate the need for chemical pesti-
cides but do allow their use to be sharply reduced. Several
international organizations have modest programs along these
lines. Far more needs to be done.'
2. Other Toxic Materials
Internationally, very little has been done to regulate toxic
materials other than pesticides. Most chemicals are toxic in some
concentration, and it is accordingly not possible to state which are
"toxic." Nevertheless, the U.S. and the EC have identified a few
substances which pose special threats to human health or to the
environment. These substances can be used, if at all, only with
special protective measures. Unfortunately, most developed coun-
tries allow these same substances to be sold for use abroad. 82 This
178. Taken collectively, these approaches are called "integrated pest management."
The need for approaches which minimize chemical pesticides is based in part on the harm-
ful effects of pesticides in excessive quantities on human health and the environment and in
part on the fact that insects develop resistance and ultimately immunity to the effects of the
pesticide, requiring that ever greater quantities be used. In addition to the adverse environ-
mental effects, this greatly increases the costs of pesticides, a matter of great concern to
developing countries.
179. A way to do this is to introduce the predators of the pests into the fields. One
problem with many chemical pesticides is that they kill both pests and the insects which
help keep the pests under control. When the pests develop resistance to the pesticide, the
situation can become worse than when no pesticides were used.
180. Pherimones are the natural odors given off by organisms, such as insects, to lure
mates. Spraying pherimones interferes with reproduction, thereby minimizing the numbers
of pests. An analogous technique is the deliberate release of sterilized pests, thereby simi-
larly interfering with successful reproduction. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(LAEA) has had considerable success with this approach with certain pest species. See A.
KRAstisH, Tim PEACEFUL ATOM IN FORMGN POLICY 139 (1963).
181. However, according to the FDA the American food supply is freer from pesticide
residues than previously thought. According to a new report, 96 percent of imported food
from 88 countries was free from pesticides or had residues within tolerance limits. Ninety-
Nine Percent of U.S. Food Tested by FDA Found to Be Free From Illegal Residues, 14
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1024 (Oct. 5, 1990).
182. For example, in the U.S. the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90
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is not currently a contentious international issue. The topic is ripe
for international negotiation, in the interest of protecting the
global commons and working out a common consent scheme which
will protect trade secrets.18
3. Cross-Border Shipments of Hazardous Waste
Recently, there have been several disturbing incidents in
which hazardous waste has been shipped across international fron-
tiers without the informed consent and, in some cases, without the
knowledge of the receiving government. 18 4 As with commerce in
pesticides, each nation possesses theoretical authority to deal with
this problem by forbidding the importation of substances whose
contents are disapproved of or unknown. In practice, recipient
countries have been incapable of preventing these incidents. First,
countries differ considerably in the degree to which the central
government is actually in control of its territory. One serious inci-
dent occurred in Lebanon, when approximately 2,400 tons of haz-
ardous waste were dumped in an area thought to "belong" to one
militia, but which was temporarily occupied by another.'1 5 Second,
many-perhaps virtually all-countries lack enough literate, hon-
est, trained customs inspectors who can recognize a hazard and are
willing to do something about it. Because of this problem, inci-
dents occurred in Nigeria, where authorities found large volumes
of chemical wastes, which originated in Italy, improperly stored
and misleadingly labeled."8 6
Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2671 (1988)), allows the export
of chemicals which are manufactured exclusively for export without meeting most of the
requirements of the Act. See id. § 2611(a)(1). On the other hand, the Act does require notifi-
cation to the recipient country if the substance is one for which the EPA requires the sub-
mission of data or which has been (or is proposed to be) banned or restricted under the Act.
Id. §§ 2611(b)(1) & (2).
183. As previously mentioned, those toxic substances which pose threats to the global
commons should be banned or their uses severely restricted. A notification and consent
scheme, coupled with sharing information on toxic effects, should suffice for the remainder
of such hazardous materials.
184. See Waste-Watching, ECNosMaST, Feb. 18, 1989, at 43-44.
185. Chemical Waste Dumped on Top of Lebanon's Woes, Miami Herald, Nov. 17,
1988, at 3C, col. 1; see Abu-Nasr, Shipments of Tainted Meat, Toxic Waste Threaten War-
Weary Lebanon, L.A. Times, July 10, 1988, at A10, col. 1.
186. See Waste-Watching, supra note 184, at 44. The wanton irresponsibility of the
Italian companies involved in shipping the waste to Nigeria was fortunately countered by
the quick action of the Italian government to get the 8,000 leaking drums returned to Italy
at considerable cost for proper disposal. See id.; Shutt, Pollution Turns into Hot Issue for
Italy, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 27, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
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A partial solution would be an international agreement which
requires that shippers everywhere truthfully label all hazardous
waste shipments-domestic and international-and that the
hazards be correctly identified on the shipper's manifest. A further
requirement would be for the country of origin to impose harsh
penalties for incorrect manifesting. 187 Finally, recipient govern-
ments should be given accurate and advanced notification. 88 The
recently concluded Basel Convention," ' negotiated under UNEP
auspices, contains some of these features and a number of other
useful provisions. After an inordinate delay, the U.S. finally signed
the Convention. 90 The Basel Convention is a major success, both
because of the complexity of the subject and the difficulty of the
international politics involved. The U.S. foot-dragging in signing
was incomprehensible since the agreement imposes few significant
obligations on U.S. exports of hazardous wastes which are not al-
ready contained in domestic legislation.' Yet, the delay cost the
U.S. a significant loss of reputation in the environmental field.
There is a body of opinion in the U.S. that would go further
and prohibit the export of any hazardous waste.'92 Indeed, in the
author's view changes in U.S. domestic law are needed (i) to pro-
vide a guarantee that extremely hazardous wastes, if exported, will
pose no risk to the U.S. or the global commons, and (ii) to assure
that with respect to other forms of waste, the receiving government
really is giving its informed consent. In the absence of interna-
tional pressure for a ban (which had little support at Basel), a gen-
eral prohibition on the export of hazardous waste does not make
187. See Waste- Watching, supra note 184, at 44.
188. Id.
189. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes,
Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]. The Basel Convention,
unlike many early environmental agreements, which were largely aspirational statements, is
very specific, with numerous obligations binding under international law. The Convention
may be the harbinger of stronger more precise international agreements in this field.
190. Briefly, L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
191. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988)), already controls exports of
hazardous waste from the U.S. Such export can take place only where there is an interna-
tional agreement with the receiving country regulating shipments of hazardous waste (as in
the two agreements the U.S. has with Mexico and Canada) or where there is advanced con-
sent to the shipment by the receiving government. Id. § 6938(a). Proper labels are also re-
quired. Id.
192. The EC has already banned the export of hazardous waste as defined by the Basel
Convention (see supra note 187, art. 1) to the 68 developing.countries party to the Lome IV
Convention. 29 I.L.M. 809, 819 (1990) (signed but not ratified by the requisite number of
countries as of June 1990).
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sense for all substances."' s
H. Trans-Border Air and Water Pollution
One common international environmental problem is pollu-
tants originating in one country which travel across international
frontiers and cause harm in a neighboring country.""' International
efforts to deal with this problem have had modest success. Among
these are the U.S.-Canadian cooperation on water pollution in the
Great Lakes;19 U.S.-Mexican cooperation on smelter releases pre-
viously discussed;1 6 and the various actions pursuant to a Conven-
tion for the protection of the Rhine River."9 ' There is also no
shortage of pious declarations on the subject at the international
level. 198
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATIES AND INSTITUTIONS
The international community has done more to build the nec-
essary legal and organizational institutions for international envi-
ronmental protection than might be supposed. True, there is no
over-arching international organization with authority to set stan-
dards which would minimize harm to the global environment or
harm to the environment of neighboring countries or which could
compel the world's nations to comply. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to point to international organizations with such super-national
powers on any global issue. Certainly, the U.N. rarely plays such a
coercive role in maintaining international peace; the response to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is a notable exception, and even in that
situation, the U.N.'s effectiveness depends primarily on the forces
193. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1989). As a consequence of the "mixture rule" and other
peculiar features of U.S. environmental law, a substance may be obliged to carry the label
"hazardous waste" and yet pose no hazard. Id. Such silliness is a U.S. domestic problem and
should not trigger unreasonably stringent export rules.
194. The problems under consideration here are conceptually different and require dif-
ferent solutions than the long-range transport problems such as acid rain.
195. Agreement Between the United States and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality,
Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 10798.
196. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
197. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, Dec. 3,
1976, 16 I.L.M. 242 (1977).
198. See The Declaration of the Hague of March 11, 1989, reprinted in 12 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 215 (Apr. 12, 1989); The Stockholm Declaration of June 16, 1972, 11
I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
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of one superpower and the tacit support of the other. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF),' e while quite important, is a less
significant player in international currency and debt matters than
the seven major Western industrial countries. The World Health
Organization (WHO)20 0 does useful work, but lacks the authority
to play more than a minor role in halting the spread of a major
international epidemic such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS). Indeed, there are only a few cases where an inter-
national organization, rather than a key nation state, is the single
most important player on a vital international issue.2 1
Fortunately, establishment of a super-national organization is
not the only means of addressing the problems discussed above.
Granted, international environmental problems are severe and
probably getting worse, yet the process of building the interna-
tional legal institutions necessary to handle these problems is fur-
ther along than many would suspect. Beginning shortly after
World War II and accelerating in fits and starts after the 1972
Stockholm Conference, a web of international and regional organi-
zations, treaties, and arrangements were quietly put in place to
handle international environmental problems.20 2
A. International Organizations
1. United Nations Environment Programme
A global-level environmental organization was first established
in 1972 with the founding of the UNEP, headquartered in Nairobi,
Kenya.2 0 3 In terms of focusing international attention on global en-
vironmental issues, the Nairobi location was almost certainly a
199. See YEARBOOK, supra note 66, at 878-79.
200. Id. at 130-34.
201. The only clear exception which occurs to the author is the International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU), one of the U.N.'s specialized agencies. The ITU is responsible for
the allocation of electromagnetic broadcast frequencies, upon which radio and television
broadcasts and much of the world's telephone and data transmission systems depend. YEAR-
BOOK, supra note 66, at 98-101. It is arguably more important on that issue than any single
nation-state.
202. There were some international environmental protection measures well before the
war. Many of them were thought of as conservation measures, such as those designed to
protect wildlife from extinction so that they could continue to be harvested in the future.
203. YEARBOOK, supra note 66, at 710. The decision to locate in Nairobi was in response
to Third World criticism that all the headquarters of the U.N. specialized agencies-and the
considerable employment and indirect benefits which they provide-were located in devel-
oped countries.
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mistake.0" On the other hand, it has served to increase awareness
of environmental issues in the Third World. This may partially ex-
plain why the North-South conflict on environmental issues has
been less severe than the conflict over trade, financing, aid, and
many other issues.
The UNEP has virtually no standard-setting functions,205
though, as previously noted, the same could be said for most inter-
national organizations.o e Despite these limitations, the UNEP has
done valuable work. It disseminates information, brings experts to-
gether, funds research, and maintains a data bank on the state of
the world's environment.
By far, the UNEP's most important activity has been to serve
as a catalyst for and facilitator of international conventions in the
environmental field.207 The UNEP performed that role for the Vi-
enna Convention and its Montreal Protocol on the Protection of
the Ozone layer. Stratospheric ozone protection is arguably the
most difficult environmental issue the international community has
come to grips with. The UNEP played a similar role in bringing
together nations for the negotiation of the important, new Basel
Convention that regulates international transport of hazardous
204. From the perspective of press attention, one of the cities commonly used for inter-
national organization headquarters, such as Geneva or Vienna, would almost certainly have
been a better choice.
205. The UNEP does have Secretariat responsibilities under article XII of the CITES
Convention. CITES, supra note 149, 27 U.S.T. at 1106-07, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 19-20, 993
U.N.T.S. at 252-53. Additionally, the UNEP temporarily (and likely permanently) has Sec-
retariat responsibilities under the Basel Convention. Basel Convention, supra note 189, 28
I.L.M. at 673. While Secretariat functions are largely administrative, the Secretariat does
perform minor roles in the verification of treaty compliance under article XVI of the Basel
Convention. Id. at 672. With these exceptions, the UNEP has no enforcement
responsibilities.
206. There are important exceptions. With respect to standard-setting, the ITU allo-
cates broadcast frequencies. The ICAO sets standards for aircraft and for international
practice in air transport. The IMO designates sea lanes.
207. It might be argued that international organizations are not necessary to the negoti-
ation of international conventions. After all, throughout the 19th century, and on occasion
in the 20th, large international conventions have been gathered for specific purposes without
international organization backing or support. Having said that, it is dramatically more dif-
ficult to handle the practical arrangements and avoid political difficulties inherent in hold-
ing a major international conference unless some near-universal membership organization
takes an active role. For that reason, it is likely that more progress has been made in negoti-
ations under UNEP auspices than would have resulted without its sponsorship. In addition,
the periodic meetings of the UNEP at senior levels (e.g., Ministers of the Environment)
serve to bring the key players in the various nations together, thereby helping to foster a
climate in which future negotiations are productive.
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waste.2"
2. International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA is best known for its roles in promoting the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy and for its "safeguards" (inspection) sys-
tem, designed to detect-and thus deter-any diversion of nuclear
materials to non-peaceful purposes. 09 Nevertheless, from its incep-
tion, the IAEA has undertaken useful activities in environmental
and related matters including radiation protection, disposal of nu-
clear waste, and use of radiation to sterilize and thereby help to
eradicate insect pests without chemical pesticides.21 0
The IAEA greatly expanded its environmental and public
health-related activities following the fire at the Chernobyl nuclear
reactor in the Soviet Union. The IAEA's most significant accom-
plishment was sponsoring the negotiations which led to the agree-
ment on the obligation to notify other countries of cross-border re-
leases of radiation2 1 ' and the agreement to provide mutual
assistance in the case of such an emergency.212 Due largely to the
intransigence of the Soviet Union, the IAEA was not able to obtain
universal agreement on an international obligation to compensate
in the event of harm from such releases.113 Such a provision, bind-
ing even on the superpowers, would not have been unprecedented.
208. See Basel Convention, supra note 189.
209. YEARBOOK, supra note 66, at 51-52.
210. See supra note 180.
211. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 1.L.M.
1370 (1986).
212. Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emer-
gency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1377 (1986).
213. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 2
I.L.M. 727 (1963) and the Paris Convention of July 29, 1960, on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy, reprinted in 55 AbL J. IrN'L L. 1082 (1961)'are in force. Neither the
U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. are a party to either. These conventions make recovery of monetary
damages easier by holding power plant operators strictly liable for cross-boundary damage
(i.e., without a need to show negligence.) On the other hand, the conventions place severe
caps on total liability. The Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris
Convention of 29th July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 2
I.L.M. 685 (1963) [hereinafter The Brussels Convention] which supplements the Paris Con-
vention, raised the liability ceiling to 120 million ecu (US$165,144,000 million). The
Chernobyl accident showed such a figure to be preposterously low. Recently, the IAEA ne-
gotiated a joint protocol designed to .link the Vienna and Paris agreements into a more
broadly-based scheme. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the 1963 Vienna Con-
vention and the 1960 Paris Convention, 1989, CMND. SaR. MISC. 12, No. 774 (not in force);
see 96 Countries Agree to Link Conventions on Compensation for Nuclear Accidents, 11
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 519 (Oct. 12, 1988).
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For example, the Outer Space Treaty1 4 holds a state which
launches objects into outer space liable for any damage which such
an object may subsequently cause to any other party to the Treaty
or any of its "natural or juridical persons.
2 1 5
3. Other U.N.-Related Agencies
The UNEP and the IAEA are not the only organizations
within the U.N. system dealing with the environment. For exam-
ple, the IMO was responsible for the negotiation of the London
Dumping Convention21' and the MARPOL Convention,2'1 7 both of
which are invaluable to marine pollution issues. The WHO has an
active program on pesticide residues in food i s and publishes infor-
mation of the effects of environmental pollutants on human health.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has adopted an In-
ternational Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesti-
cides21' and has performed important work on conservation of
tropical forest ecosystems. Some of the scientific data on ozone de-
pletion was collected and analyzed under the auspices of the World
Meteorological Organization, which also runs the Background Air
Pollution Monitoring Network. The ICAO has adopted standards
for the regulation of aircraft engine emissions and adopted specifi-
cations for the transportation of dangerous goods by air. In short,
many U.N.-specialized and related organizations have some role to
play in international environmental protection.
214. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
215. Id. 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209. We thus face
the following anomalous situation: if a nation launches a satellite containing a small thermo-
electric nuclear power source, the launching nation would be liable for any damages it
caused if the satellite were to de-orbit and release radioactivity. The same nation's enor-
mously larger power reactors, however, can leak radioactivity across national frontiers caus-
ing widespread damage and loss of life without comparable liability.
216. London Dumping Convention, supra note 109.
217. MARPOL Convention, supra note 103.
218. The WHO funds extensive research on pesticide residues. For an example of the
WHO's efforts to control diseases from contaminated water, see Kraft, W. Africa Gains
Hope of Ending River Blindness, L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
219. See 54 Fed. Reg. 29,524, (1989) (citing Food and Agriculture Organization of the




In addition to the U.N. and its specialized agencies, other in-
ternational organizations (either wholly outside the U.N. system or
only very loosely affiliated with it) have important responsibilities
in some aspects of environmental protection. For example, despite
its weaknesses, the IWC is the critical institution for the protection
of whales. 2 0 The OECD"'1 has prepared several influential reports
on air pollution and adopted guiding principles on trans-frontier
movements of hazardous waste. The OECD has also established
common testing requirements for toxic chemicals, which have facil-
itated global knowledge of the toxicological properties of chemicals
in commerce, while reducing the adverse economic impact which
would result from conflicting testing requirements.
B. Regional Institutions
Regional organizations have, in some cases, performed useful
work in environmental protection. For example, the U.N. regional
economic commissions have sponsored the negotiation of treaties
which foster regional environmental protection.2 22 The most nota-
ble of these is the ECE. The ECE was the sponsoring organization
for the agreement on reducing air emissions of sulfur dioxide 23
and the more recent agreement on nitrogen oxides.
2 4
Probably the most important regional organization in the en-
vironmental field is the EC, in part because it has many of the
powers normally held only by nation-states. Evaluating the envi-
220. The IWC administers the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
221. See YEARBOOK, supra note 66, at 240-42.
222. There are U.N. Economic Commissions for Africa, Latin America, and Europe. In
addition, there are Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific and Western
Asia (basically, the Middle East). Several countries are members of more than one commis-
sion (e.g., the Soviet Union is a member of both the European and Asian commissions, and
the U.S. is a member of the Commissions for Latin America and Europe). YEARBOOK, supra
note 66, at 711-15. Despite their names, the Economic Commissions have often dealt with
matters which go beyond economics.
223. See Sulfur Dioxide Protocol, supra note 68 and accompanying text. The Sulfur
Dioxide Protocol is largely moribund for lack of participation by key countries.
224. See Nitrogen Oxide Protocol, supra note 67 and accompanying text. As explained
more thoroughly in Regional Issues, infra part V(A)(2), the nitrogen oxide agreement is
conceptually flawed, and the ECE would have been better advised, all things considered, to
have focused its attention on a narrower group of countries. Nevertheless, the 1988 Protocol
was entered into force on February 14, 1991. [Reference File] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) Supp.
No. 103, at 27 (Jan. 1991).
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ronmental role of the EC to date is difficult. It can be argued that
the EC's institutions have spurred environmental protection in
Western Europe by adopting common minimum standards in
many areas.22 In addition, cooperation on other matters has made
the Europeans more aware of environmental issues, spreading the
political impetus for more effective domestic controls. Having said
that, a case can also be made that the EC, with its cumbersome
decision-making processes and its requirements for unanimity on
most major issues has actually been an impediment to more effec-
tive environmental protection in that region. According to this the-
ory, the EC has restrained the more environmentally-minded
Danes, Germans, and Dutch, while putting little pressure on the
more development-oriented Southern European nations.22 ' The es-
tablishment of a truly common internal market in 1992 may make
these conflicts substantially worse.
The Organization of American States (OAS) "2 ' has played a
modest role in disseminating information on common environmen-
tal challenges in the Western Hemisphere, but its efforts have been
severely hampered by recent budgetary problems..22  The NATO's
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society has done a great
deal by way of studies and demonstration projects, some of them
involving non-NATO countries. Most other important regional or-
ganizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (the
OAU), 229 the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
2 3 0
and the League of Arab States (LAS) 231 can point to activities they
have engaged in with respect to some aspect of the environment,
but none could be said to play an important role. s2
225. The EC has issued directives in most areas of environmental protection, including
air, water, hazardous waste, toxic substances, and marine pollution. For a thorough but de-
liberately non-analytical discussion, see S. JOHNSON & G. CORCELLE, supra note 172.
226. One example of the kind of problem which has arisen was the dispute over auto-
emission standards. The desire of the Danes, Dutch, and Germans to impose stronger emis-
sions standards for passenger vehicles was resisted for years within the EC, largely under
pressure of the Italians and French, on the accurate but environmentally irrelevant ground
that they were an impediment to intra-EC trade. As a result, European auto-emission stan-
dards have lagged far behind those of the U.S. and Japan. See id. at 124-34; Sullivan, EC
Moves on CFCs, Other Air Pollutants, CHEMucAL & ENGINEERING Nzws, June 27, 1988, at 6.
227. See YEARBOOK, supra note 66, at 427-30.
228. Cf. Slim-line State, EcONOMST, Oct. 24, 1987, at 30. The OAS has given considera-
tion to establishing a nature conservancy for the Hemisphere. OEA/Ser. G. CP/doc. 2036/89.
229. See YEARBOOK, supra note 66, at 426-27.
230. Id. at 310-12.
231. Id. at 421-22.
232. The conclusion in text is intended merely as a statement of fact not as an implied
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C. Treaty Law
Negotiation of numerous international, regional, and bilateral
treaties has substantially advanced the field of international envi-
ronmental law.2"8 Indeed, it is difficult to point to much progress in
the field except through the use of the treaty instrument.
IV. ASSESSING CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORTS
A. Concerted International Action is Not Always Benign
In an era of repeated calls for international action to save the
global environment, it is worth recalling that the international
community is capable of acting collaboratively in ways which do
far more harm than good. International liability limits on oil tank-
ers and nuclear power plant operators are significant causes of en-
vironmental risk. Similarly, as previously discussed, the interna-
tional financial institutions have historically been far more a part
of the problem than of the solution. That characterization is still a
fair description of all of them except possibly the World Bank,
which has substantially increased its environmental staff and has
recently announced a policy to take environmental matters into ac-
count in all its activities.2 ' Nevertheless, many environmentalists
remain skeptical.
235
Another example of how international action may not necessa-
rily coincide with improved protection of the environment is the
Antarctic Treaty2 36 and related conventions. The original Antarctic
criticism. Many existing regional organizations have enough problems already and may not
be good candidates in terms of expertise and political composition to take on additional
responsibilities in the environmental field. Nevertheless, there is a severe leadership vacuum
on international environmental issues in some regions.
233. The most important of these agreements have already been discussed. A full list-
ing of them-of which there are dozens to hundreds, depending on the breadth of the defi-
nition of the environment-is beyond the purposes of this article. For a listing of treaties
and other agreements in the environmental arena, see Register of International Treaties
and Other Agreements in the Field of the Environment, UNEP/GC.15/lnf.2 (May 1989).
234. See World Bank Unveils Environmental Plan to be Integrated into All Its Activi-
ties, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 486-87 (Oct. 11, 1989).
235. See id. The ill-considered remarks of World Bank President Conable at a confer-
ence in Tokyo, denigrating evidence that global warming poses serious risks (a scientific
issue very far beyond the IBRD's competence) raised doubts in the minds of many-this
author included-as to whether that institution has yet begun to take environmental issues
seriously. See World Bank President Links Economic Development, Environmental Protec-
tion, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 407 (Sept. 18, 1989).
236. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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Treaty of 1959 came about in part because of the exceptional value
of scientific research being carried out in Antarctica and the need
to establish conditions which would encourage further research.
One of the most compelling reasons to engage in scientific research
in that forbidding location was its pristine character. 37 Ironically,
the scientists involved have been imprudent in their waste disposal
practices, polluting the very environment they were studying.38 On
the other hand, the parties have negotiated two useful supplemen-
tal conventions designed to conserve Antarctic seals and other liv-
ing resources of Antarctica. 8s
A more difficult matter to assess is the recently concluded
Antarctic Minerals Convention, 40 designed to allow exploration for
and possibly exploitation of Antarctica's resources under carefully
controlled conditions. If the alternative to the Minerals Conven-
tion is unrestrained exploitation by states with territorial claims to
Antarctica, then the Minerals Convention represents a major step
forward in environmental protection.' If, however, the Minerals
Convention actually fosters exploitation that otherwise would not
take place, we could be significantly worse off than at present. Cer-
tainly, the experience with oil drilling on the Alaskan North Slope
is not entirely reassuring with respect to mankind's ability to ex-
ploit resources in fragile environments without environmental
237. Nations have conducted important research in Antarctica on ozone depletion,
global warming, and long-range transport of toxic substances. This research would have
been more difficult, perhaps impossible, if the continent were more heavily polluted.
238. See Carpenter, Opening the Last Frontier, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 24,
1988, at 65.
239. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441,
T.I.A.S. No. 8826; Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
Apr. 7, 1982, 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240.
240. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for
signature Nov. 25, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 (1988) [hereinafter Minerals Convention].
241. The Minerals Convention contains a number of useful provisions designed to mini-
mize environmental damage. The agreement, for example, makes the provision for closing
certain areas of special scientific or environmental interest and establishes procedures
whereby general environmental protection measures can be adopted. Whether such mea-
sures will be sufficient to prevent serious environmental degradation at the site of prospect-
ing and exploration remains to be seen. The Minerals Convention's numerous safeguards
will almost certainly be better than having the Antarctic Treaty regime break down, thereby
leaving mineral exploitation in national hands. Many of the nations with territorial claims
to Antarctica have appalling records for domestic environmental protection and can, there-
fore, be expected to do nothing to protect Antarctica outside the Minerals Convention con-
text. For a more thorough discussion of the Minerals Convention, see Oxman, Evaluating
the Antarctic Minerals Convention: The Decision-making System, 21 U. MIAMI INTE-AM.
L. REv. 17 (1989).
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damage.2 42 In any event, no amount of site-specific environmental
protection will serve to keep Antarctica pristine, as it now still
largely is.
2 14
France and Australia have proposed to make the Antarctic a
"world park" free from exploitation. This proposal has been re-
jected by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and several other nations
party to the Antarctic Treaty, but seems, nevertheless, to be gath-
ering momentum.24"
B. Selecting Standards for Evaluation
If the standard for judging the condition of international law
and diplomacy in the sphere of international environmental pro-
tection is the implementation of effective binding measures to deal
with each serious problem, then we are very far from that goal. As
has been demonstrated, many environmental problems have not
yet been effectively addressed at the international level, even
though they are severe and promise to get worse. Moreover, even
where there are agreements, many have vague or weak provisions,
lack adherence by key states, or suffer from ineffective
enforcement.
For example, the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol on
242. It seems highly improbable that the international community will adopt measures
more stringent than the U.S. imposed in Alaska for drilling on the North Slope. Despite
these stringent requirements, there was damage, though not to the apocalyptic extent pre-
dicted by some. See Shabecoff, Oilfield Practices Viewed As Threat to Land in Arctic, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 5, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
243. See Argentine Ship Spills Diesel Fuel into Pristine Section of Antarctic Penin-
sula, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 53 (Feb. 8, 1989); Joyner, The Evolving Minerals
Regime for Antarctica, in THE ANTARCTICA LEG.AL REGIME 147-48 (C. Joyner & S. Chopra
eds. 1988).
244. Thirty-nine nations agreed to meet to attempt to replace the Minerals Convention
with a new, more acceptable agreement. This may be a death-blow to the Minerals Conven-
tion. See Antarctic Minerals Development Convention Encounters Major Obstacles at
Paris Meeting, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 529, 529-30 (Nov. 8, 1989). The Bush
administration still hopes to resuscitate the Convention by seeking international agreement
now on liability provisions for environmental damage if exploitation does take place. Envi-
ronment, U.S. Seeks International Accord to Extend Antarctica Convention, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA), at A3 (July 23, 1990). As noted, replacement of the Minerals Conven-
tion with a new agreement is desirable on environmental grounds only if (i) the new agree-
ment is genuinely more protective and (ii) nations which intend to undertake exploitation of
Antarctica's resources in conformance with the Minerals Convention agree instead to be-
come parties to the new agreement. The first of these without the second would represent a
step backward.
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Ozone Depletion was a remarkable achievement.24 5 Yet, it was not
sufficiently stringent, by itself, to prevent very serious depletion of
the ozone layer over the next several decades. The amendments to
the Protocol reached at a conference in London to make further
reductions in CFCs and provide a special fund-$240 million dol-
lars over the next three years to help developing coun-
tries-illustrate the world's commitment to continue progress on
this issue. Already, India and China have announced their inten-
tion to join this amended Montreal Protocol.240 Unfortunately, un-
less enough states become a party to both the original Montreal
Protocol and the recent amendments, the effort will fail.
A second possible method to judge the effectiveness of the in-
ternational community on international environmental issues is to
compare the rate of progress on those issues with the community's
rate of progress on other politically intractable, nationalistically
sensitive issues. From that perspective, one can conclude that the
international community is doing quite well on environmental mat-
ters. The reasons for this relative success include the urgency and
severity of the problems and the fact that practical solutions have
been found which do not require basic changes in the international
order.
A third approach would look not to results, but rather to the
establishment of institutions and community norms on which fu-
ture progress might be built. If this is the standard, the nations of
the world have already laid down a substantial foundation, but a
great deal remains to be done.
It may be worth noting at this point that these conclusions are
relatively insensitive to the validity of any judgment about particu-
lar issues in the preceding parts. Desertification could become even
worse than has been portrayed. The plastic pollution of the oceans
245. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 48. Before the negotiations began, the author
was pessimistic as to the prospects for successfully negotiating any international agreement
which would halt the growth in the release of CFCs. The result achieved at Montreal was
the product of a combination of good diplomacy, a responsible attitude on the part of U.S.
industry, new scientific evidence which made the case for immediate action more compel-
ling, and avoidance of the bitter North-South contention that has often characterized multi-
lateral negotiations. The latter point was primarily the result of the very constructive roles
played by several developing countries. This is remarkable since most developing countries
had less at stake than did the developed countries. Ozone depletion is most severe closer to
the poles, where the developed countries are located. See Zuren, Studies on Ozone Destruc-
tion Expand Beyond Antarctic, CMIeicAL & ENGINEERING NEws, May 30, 1988, at 16-25.
246. Hemonick, Letting the Earth Breathe Easier, Ttmz, July 9, 1990, at 63.
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might be far less serious than expected. Perhaps, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank is actually helping the environment rather than
harming it. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that all of the judgments
are skewed in the same direction. Even if they were, they could be
-very far-off before one would come to the conclusion that every-
thing is fine and no institutional changes are needed or to the con-
trary conclusion that no institutions and agreements worthy of re-
tention have been established for international environmental
protection.
C. The Improbability of Fundamental Structural Change
When compared with nation-states, the international commu-
nity is notoriously slow, generally inefficient, and frequently inef-
fective. These undeniable facts have led some to argue that we
need a new international "order," wholly new institutions which
will have the power to force nations into measures more protective
of the environment. 24 7 Such expectations are politically unrealistic.
Nationalism is perhaps the single most powerful force in recent
world history. Nations do not readily agree to any measure which
will permanently curtail their sovereignty.248 This statement can be
made for virtually all international issues. It is unreasonable to ex-
pect the performance of the international community to be signifi-
cantly better on international environmental issues than on even
more critical matters-like reducing global risks of nuclear or
chemical weapons proliferation-if the price is a significant dero-
gation of national sovereignty.
For these reasons, there is no prospect that the international
community will agree soon to establish new super-national institu-
tions which can rapidly accelerate the pace of international rule-
making and force recalcitrant nations to adopt environmentally
protective policies. Even if such super-national structures ulti-
mately evolve, they will not arise in the time frames needed to deal
247. Creating a new international order is no small task. Cf. Rothstein, Commodity
Bargaining: The Political Economy of Regime Creation, in PosrrvE SuM 15 (I.W. Zartman
ed. 1987) (discussing the problems involved in creating a "New Economic Order").
248. Of course, in one sense, entering into any treaty restricts a nation's sovereignty, in
the same way that any contract restricts the contracting parties' freedom with respect to the
matters covered by the contract. Those seeking a new environmental order want measures
adopted whereby nations agree now to be bound by rules created in the future, without a
right to decline to be bound by those rules. Such measures are a far greater infringement on
national sovereignty and are rarely agreed to. See Charney, Technology and International
Negotiations, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 81 (1982).
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with the problems identified above.
There was a recent attempt to create such a structure, but it
failed for predictable reasons. The March 11, 1989 Declaration of
the Hague called for the strengthening of U.N. institutions in the
field of the environment or the establishment of new institutions.
Early drafts of the resolution called for (i) establishment of a new
organization with strong enforcement powers, (ii) a significant
strengthening of the powers of the International Court of Justice,
and (iii) economic sanctions against countries that do not comply.
These proposals were all eliminated or very significantly watered
down.2 49 It is hard to know how serious the attempt to establish
new super-national institutions at The Hague actually was. On the
one hand, the number of countries represented by heads of state or
heads of government was quite impressive, making the toothless-
ness of the final declaration (which is not a treaty) a compelling
reminder of the unwillingness of governments to relinquish deci-
sion-making power. On the other hand, if it is true that the U.S.,
the Soviet Union, and China were not invited, it casts serious
doubt on the genuineness of the endeavor. The organizers are so-
phisticated enough to know that these three governments are noto-
riously unwilling to support measures they have not participated in
from the start. Without their ultimate participation, little by way
of global institutional change is possible. Part of the failure at The
Hague may ironically have been the result of earlier criticism of
Brazil by organizations and politicians in the U.S., France, and
elsewhere. Brazil reportedly resisted a stronger declaration, fearing
interference in Amazonian matters.
25 0
D. The Concept of an International Regime
International cooperation on the environment is not funda-
mentally different from other international endeavors. For that
reason, it is subject to the same radically differing visions of inter-
249. See Lovell, World Edges Closer to Action with Hague Environment Treaty, Reu-
ter Library Report, Mar. 12, 1989 (wire service).
250. See Simons, supra note 170. A pale shadow of the Hague vision survived in an
inter-parliamentary grouping called GLOBE, Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced
Environment, which is pressing for more action by governments. See Percival, Environment
Parliamentarians Band Together for Globe's Protection, Inter Press Service, June 1, 1990
(wire service). GLOBE recently met and announced plans to introduce parallel legislation
dealing with climate change, deforestation, and other threats to the environment. Shabecoff,
Legislators Seek Laws to Aid Environment, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1990, § 1, at 7, col. 2.
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national politics which characterize the academic study of interna-
tional relations.
Some view the international community as a lawless arena
governed only by realpolitik, where common problems are dealt
with, if at all, only if doing so is in a state's interest. If the state's
interests change, the state will cease to cooperate. Such a vision
does not accord with the frequent willingness of states, within lim-
its, to go along with needed measures in the common interest
which do not match their narrow national interest. In economic
terms, lacking a system of compulsion, many international environ-
mental issues present nations with powerful "free rider" incen-
tives. Consider ozone depletion: if a number of larger states reduce
their CFC emissions significantly, a small nation could conclude
that halting CFC use on its own territory would have little impact
on the health of its people. The state could get the benefits of in-
ternational cooperation without cooperating and without any ad-
verse impact on its economy. A rational state would decline to co-
operate. Of course, if all states think this way, there could be no
effective control of CFCs. In fact, far greater cooperation has been
achieved on CFCs and many other international environmental
problems than such an extremely narrow vision of national interest
analysis would predict.
The opposite extreme sees international society guided by in-
ternational law. Some scholars will not flinch even when this vision
is wildly inconsistent with reality. In environmental protection, for
example, there are commentators who persist in finding a binding
obligation under international law not to cause harm to one's
neighbors.2 5 It is highly doubtful there is such an obligation, and
if there is, it is being violated far more frequently than it is being
upheld.
In any event, viewing international environmental problems
solely through the lens of international law is at best incomplete
since many of the measures needed for effective international envi-
ronmental protection do not meet the normal definitions of "inter-
national law."252 For example, a great deal of the international en-
251. Taylor, International Legal Control of the Greenhouse Effect, 20 VIcTORPA UNIV.
WELLZNGTON L. REv. 45, 49-50 (1990).
252. While the essence and limits of that term are hotly debated, a common functional
definition is the willingness of a nation to undertake or refrain from measures even if con-
trary to its preferences, because it considers itself obliged to do so (whether by treaty or
custom).
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vironmental field depends on the dissemination of information,
both among governments and scientist-to-scientist. Similarly, suc-
cess often depends on the sharing of approaches and the recogni-
tion of common problems among national political and regulatory
personnel. In other cases, progress depends on finding external
sources of funding, whose contributions are clearly discretionary
and thus not legally compelled. In a few cases, diplomats have
been able to work out common approaches which each nation will
undertake unilaterally. ' None of these approaches is "interna-
tional law" within any sensible definition of the term.
Having made this point, it is clearly erroneous to think that
international law is irrelevant. These days, many key international
environmental protection measures are either required by or un-
dertaken pursuant to treaty or occasionally by custom. Critical
roles are played on a number of issues by UNEP and other inter-
national organizations. These measures fit nearly all definitions of
international law.
A better conceptual framework for improving international ef-
forts to protect the environment would be a variation on the con-
cept, taken from international relations theory, of a "regime."
Grasping the concept of a regime can be a bit of a challenge. Per-
haps the best known definition is by Stephen Krasner: "Regimes
can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations." 5 ' This defini-
tion may be more theoretical than some readers will find useful.
For present purposes, it should be sufficient to note that nearly all
regimes involve some use of international treaties and organiza-
tions (and thus international law), but have other critical elements
which are not legal. ' They all exist at least in part because, as
253. These cases usually arise because one or more of the involved nations is not willing
to become a party to a binding agreement, but is willing to act voluntarily, as was the case
with the Nuclear Suppliers Group which agreed on a list of items that no member would
export without IAEA safeguards. The "Suppliers Guidelines," which are not an agreement
under international law but rather a series of parallel, identical declarations of national pol-
icy, are contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/254, Feb. 1987, reprinted in DocuMENTs ON
DisARmAmETr 7 (1978) [hereinafter INFCIRC].
254. S.D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Interven-
ing Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (S.D. Krasner ed. 1983).
255. Regime theorists predictably differ as to what a regime is, what its essential ele-
ments are, and which topics of international concern are governed by regimes. The descrip-
tion of the elements of a regime in text does not conform to any one theorist's description.
For example, the author places somewhat greater weight on treaties and institutions and
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Krasner. notes, norms and principles are important and frequently
succeed in inducing countries to behave in ways which differ from
their abstract preferences, even though they cannot be compelled
to abide by community norms. Regimes thus occupy a functional
niche between informal undertakings and international law and a
structural niche between ad hoc arrangements and an international
"order." A world view in which regimes are important-but not the
only feature of the international system-falls between a brutish
Hobbesian vision of international affairs wholly dominated by self-
actualizing power seekers and an utopian vision of an international
community governed by law and equipped with sufficient power to
head off all dangers on the horizon.
Good portions of the international community, including the
U.S., Japan, the U.K., the Soviet Union, and several others are
willing to create isolated, single-focus regimes to deal with selected
environmental problems (though most leaders do not utilize the
term). Proceeding by a series of wholly independent regimes-one
for global warming, a second for desertification, a third for toxic
chemicals, and so on-runs a serious risk of obtaining far less than
could be accomplished by viewing the problem of international en-
vironmental protection as having important overlapping elements
which should be addressed in concert. se
At the risk of creating even more jargon, what is needed is a
new vision in which international environmental protection is seen
as a "complex regime." While that terminology has not been used,
some international arrangements which have been called regimes
deal with a series of closely related problems (rather than a single
area) and involve a series of interlocking institutional arrange-
somewhat less on inchoate norms than does Krasner.
256. One key work on the subject, Oran R. Young's INTERNATIONAL COOEsRATION:
BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), takes the posi-
tion that fostering a series of unrelated regimes is a sufficient response to the problem. The
book is largely a reworking of Young's earlier work on regimes, but it utilizes examples from
international resource allocation problems and, to a lesser extent, environmental problems.
The work is not without its flaws. It virtually ignores the role of international law in inter-
national regimes. It has little to say on most of the currently critical international pollution
problems and suffers from key factual inaccuracies. Its judgments on the relative negotiabil-
ity of limiting CFC emissions and establishing a comprehensive liability regime for nuclear
accidents have proven to be off by 180 degrees. Nevertheless, those interested in regime
theory and its applicability to this field will find it an engaging and thought-provoking work.
For a discussion of one regime with a more substantial legal focus, see Chopra, Antarctica
as a Commons Regime: A Conceptual Framework for Cooperation and Coexistence, in THE
ANrAxRcc LEGAL REGIME 163 (C. Joyner & S. Chopra eds. 1988).
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ments (rather than a single institutional structure). They grow and
change in time in a manner somewhat like customary international
law.257 While theorists have not used the vocabulary of complex
regimes, the underlying notion has best been elaborated by Joseph
Nye, Jr., Lawrence Scheinman, and others concerning the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime.2"
A complex regime covering a set of interrelated topics or
problems arises as the international community, or major portions
of it, adopts a series of interlocking measures (some binding, some
not) toward a common (if not precisely agreed upon) goal, bol-
stered by shared values, norms, or fears. In the case of nonprolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons, these measures include two major trea-
ties, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)'59 and the Latin American
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty;260 an international organiza-
tion, the IAEA, which accounts for nuclear materials;61 a treaty
and numerous ancillary measures dealing with the closely related
issue of the physical protection of nuclear materials;262 non-treaty
agreements on export controls;6 3 informal understandings that
certain technologies of special concern will not be exported; 2" in-
telligence sharing among several countries; and a very active diplo-
macy carried out by many countries at several levels.
In the case of nuclear non-proliferation, the cumulative effect
of these disparate measures has been to consolidate the interna-
257. Many regime theorists emphasize the importance of custom and the dynamic
changes which can occur in regimes. Young, for example, believes important regimes can
arise spontaneously. Id. at 51.
258. See Nye, Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION:
BREAKING THE CHAIN 15-38 (1981); Scheinman, Nonproliferation Regime: Safeguards, Con-
trols and Sanctions, in THE NUCLEAR CONNECTION 179-210 (1985); Williamson, Nuclear
Nonproliferation (Book Review), 232 SCIENCE 663-64 (1986).
259. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A-S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
260. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, more commonly called the Treaty of
Tlatelolco.
261. This IAEA "safeguards" system involves record-keeping, sampling, inspections,
and other means of assuring that nuclear materials have not been diverted. These measures
could be thought of as reducing the participating states' national sovereignty over their nu-
clear programs.
262. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, referred to govern-
ments Oct. 26, 1979, 18 LL.M. 1419 (1979). The U.S. entered the agreement into force on
February 8, 1987.
263. INFCIRC, supra note 253. See generally Van Doren, Some Perspectives on Sup-
plier Controls in THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIER AND NON PROLIFERATION 17 (1985).
264. See INFCIRC, supra note 253.
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tional consensus against the increased spread of nuclear weapons.
That consensus has made it much easier for nations to become
parties to the NPT, its near universal membership further
strengthening the regime. The change in international norms has
been, in turn, a primary reason why no additional nations have
openly admitted the acquisition of nuclear weapons since the NPT
was concluded in 1968. The four nearest "threshold nations" take
care to hide their bomb capabilities "in the basement."2 s6 This
consensus also helps explain why the number of countries that pos-
sess nuclear weapons or are on the verge of acquiring them is con-
siderably less than every major past study had predicted.
A simple regime could not have brought about that result. The
NPT, as vital as it is, was neither a sufficient response to the prob-
lem nor a universally accepted treaty. A stronger NPT would be
even less acceptable to many countries and thus leave many states
of potential concern wholly outside the regime, while an NPT weak
enough to attain universal membership would be worthless.
Similar complex international regimes might be said to exist
in the fields of international civil air transport,266  international
trades2 7 international currency and balance of payments adjust-
ments2 68 and the law of the sea.2 6 9 Complex regimes may also be-
265. The four nations in question are Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan. Each is
believed to have enough highly-enriched uranium, plutonium, or both for one or more nu-
clear explosives, to be technically capable of designing a fission device, and to possess deliv-
ery systems capable of dropping a nuclear bomb several hundred kilometers from the point
of launch or take-off. None of these four, however, has declared itself to be a nuclear weap-
ons state, and none is known conclusively to have deployed an arsenal of readily usable
nuclear weapons for its military forces. For an excellent discussion, see L. SPECTOR, THE
UNDECLARED BOMB (1988). Discovery of an Iraqi plot to smuggle krytrons (nuclear triggers)
and subsequent revelations of other steps to acquire a nuclear weapons capability are worri-
some, but do not yet put Iraq in the same status as the other four. For a discussion of Iraq's
nuclear program, see id. at 207-18. How close each of the four is to that capability is beyond
the purposes of this paper and varies considerably among them.
266. International civil air matters are regulated by the ICAO, numerous bilateral
agreements, and a host of special arrangements.
267. International trade matters are handled under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), a treaty with a limited organizational structure; several common market
or free trade zone arrangements; innumerable bilateral trade agreements; a U.N. entity, the
United Nations Convention on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) dealing with the trade-
development linkage; an unofficial organization regulating export controls by most Western
nations, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM); and a sys-
tem for payments and resolution of disputes, much of which evolved through custom and
other arrangements.
268. The IMF, the Bank for International Settlements, special arrangements for the
EC, and numerous central bank to central bank arrangements all play interlocking roles in
international currency adjustment.
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gin to emerge to control the spread of chemical weapons, ballistic
missile technology, and other advanced delivery systems. Some ob-
servers may see a complex regime emerging to prevent the worst
human rights violations.
In each complex regime, there is no international organization
armed with powers to force nation-states to undertake actions
against their will. In contrast to a simple regime, there is rarely a
single treaty instrument which purports to deal with every aspect
of the problem. There is always less than unanimity among the
members of the international community; indeed, the opinions and
actions of some states are usually a significant part of the problem.
Instead, in a complex regime, there is a widespread but not
universal perception of a problem and a basic goal to be attained.
The problem is then attacked with a variety of means on different
levels. Specific measures or problems are usually handled as if in-
dependent, but the participants recognize that they are interre-
lated. The effect of these common efforts is not only to strengthen
prospects for success, but also slowly to make the goal itself more
nearly universally accepted, gradually transforming pragmatic ar-
rangements into normative constraints on behavior.
The international community has already set many of the ele-
ments in place to create such a complex international environmen-
tal protection regime. Indeed, some might conclude that a complex
regime already exists in this field, though key nations may not yet
recognize this fact.
V. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME
If indeed the states of the world have begun to establish a
complex international environmental protection regime, it is
clearly not yet strong enough to confront all the significant envi-
ronmental problems facing the international community. To accel-
erate the pace of progress, the international community must take
additional steps to nurture and strengthen the regime. Doing so
will require specific understandings as to the level at which
problems will be addressed, general acceptance of nations' recipro-
269. The law of the sea has arisen from both custom and treaty. It continues to evolve
despite U.S. non-adherence to the Convention. Among recent changes are the entry into
force of Annex V of MARPOL, major changes in fisheries, and new initiatives on oil trans-
port. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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cal obligations on environmental matters, and a willingness to bet-
ter match rhetoric with action.
A. International Environmental Problems Must be Ad-
dressed at the Appropriate Level
For the regime to function effectively, environmental issues
must be addressed to the proper level. There are four levels of en-
vironmental problems which need to be considered.
1. Problems Affecting the Global Commons
Global warming, ozone depletion, some marine pollution
problems, the protection of many endangered species and of ge-
netic diversity, and the halting of the release of persistent, biocon-
centrating toxic substances are issues which will impact the entire
global community. No nation, or even a handful of the most con-
cerned nations, can successfully solve them. They should be han-
dled through international conventions. The most complex issues,
such as global warming, may require a series of agreements, under-
standings, and common actions, though the advantages of an "um-
brella" agreement setting forth the primary goals and obligations
should not be ignored.
2. Regional Issues
Acid rain, pollution of the oceans from terrestrial sources, and
pollution of some rivers and seas are basically regional in charac-
ter. They should be resolved through regional cooperation, utilizing
existing regional institutions or ad hoc arrangements as
appropriate.
Recent experience suggests the need for caution when consid-
ering regional approaches to a problem. There can be unfortunate
results when the parties necessary to alleviate a regional problem
do not coincide with the actual membership in a regional organiza-
tion or regional treaty arrangement. The non-participation of a
critical player may guarantee that the agreement reached will not
be effective. Thus, for example, if the U.K. continues to reject
measures to reduce sulfur dioxide releases in Western Europe, as it
has done in the past, it will almost certainly condemn to failure the
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existing agreement on sulfur dioxide emissions.""0
On the other hand, having more participants than is needed
can also yield unfortunate results. A prime, recent example is the
new agreement on nitrogen oxide emissions." 1 The U.S. is a party
to the underlying Convention and is a member of the sponsoring
organization, the ECE. The U.S. was entitled to participate in the
negotiations giving rise to the Protocol, did so, but should not
have.
Everyone's interests were poorly served by U.S. participation.
The U.S. had a much better record of reducing nitrogen oxide
emissions than did most European countries. The Europeans
wanted to require percentage reductions from current emission
levels, on the theory that doing so would be a crude but easy and
reasonably fair way to bring about reductions. The U.S. negotia-
tors considered that proposal unacceptable because it would penal-
ize the U.S. for its better past performance. In the end, after very
protracted negotiations, the parties agreed to use an earlier year
for the base on which reductions would be calculated, namely 1987,
thereby partially meeting American objections. The resulting
agreement was a typical international accommodation of differing
interests and undoubtedly the outcome of good diplomacy.
The mistake was not the caliber of the diplomacy or the com-
promise reached, but rather having the U.S. participate in the first
place.27 ' The primary environmental problem was high levels of at-
mospheric nitrogen oxide in Western and Central Europe. Nitro-
gen oxide pollution causes health problems and is an aggravating
factor for global warming,"' acid rain, and ozone pollution. Nitro-
gen oxide levels are also a modest trans-border issue in North
America, though less so than sulfur dioxide. This fact alone is an
insufficient justification for a negotiation which attempted to deal
with both the European and North American problems simultane-
ously. Neither region is a major contributor to the nitrogen oxide
problems of the other.274 The better approach would have been for
270. See Sulfur Dioxide Protocol, supra note 68.
271. See Nitrogen Oxide Protocol, supra note 67.
272. The issue is not the right of the U.S. to participate, but rather the wisdom of its
decision to exercise that right on this particular topic.
273. Nitrous oxide can last 180 years in the atmosphere and is 200 times as heat absor-
bent as carbon dioxide. Under the Sun, supra note 12, at 79.
274. There has been some discussion of the ECE sponsoring negotiation of a third pro-
tocol to deal with the ozone. Because of the short half-life of most ozone precursors, a single
agreement dealing with ozone pollution in both Europe and North America makes even less
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the Europeans to reach their own agreement without the U.S. and
for the U.S., Canada, and possibly Mexico to have negotiated a
second agreement.
7 5
This is not simply a matter of theory; real harm to the inter-
ests of all parties resulted from this mismatch of problem and par-
ticipant. The U.S. involvement significantly delayed agreement.
Accommodation of U.S. concerns (which were quite legitimate) re-
sulted in the choice of a lower baseline for reductions and thus





The situation is also unfortunate from the U.S. perspective.
The base year chosen means that the agreement will not force sub-
stantial improvement in U.S. air quality. The U.S. will not benefit
in any significant way from the nitrogen oxide reductions brought
about in Europe. In addition, there were significant opportunity
costs. The negotiations diverted key State Department and EPA
personnel from more important international environmental
projects. Finally, the precedent set is an unfortunate one from the
American perspective.2" If, as seems likely, effective international
sense than one dealing with nitrogen oxide.
275. There has already been some progress toward that goal. The U.S. and Canada
planned to begin to negotiate a bilateral air quality accord on August 28, 1990. The purpose
of this meeting was to seek an agreement on a framework to provide the means for address-
ing trans-boundary air pollution. The hoped-for results would include coordinated research
and monitoring programs and a joint dispute resolution mechanism. Environment, Talks on
Bilateral Air Quality Accord Between U.S., Canada to Start in August, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA), at A3 (July 17, 1990).
. 276. The harm of U.S. participation has been partially offset by a pledge of 12 mostly
Northern European countries .to bring about a further 30 percent reduction beyond that
required by the Protocol. See 25 ECE Members Sign Protocol to Limit Emissions of Nitro-
gen Oxides, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 581 (Nov. 9, 1988). Of course, one cannot
be absolutely certain that a more stringent, legally binding agreement would have been
achieved without U.S. participation. However, with U.S. participation, those nations which
did not favor a stronger agreement found it easy to hide behind the U.S. position.
277. If the outcome is so unfortunate from the U.S. perspective, one might ask how the
U.S. became involved. The explanation goes back to the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Secur-
ity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). See President Ford Visits Romania and Yugoslavia
Following European Security Conference, 73 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 363 (1975). For an informa-
tive discussion on the CSCE see Bogdan, Crossing the European Divide, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1989, at 56, 61-75. The Soviet Union originated the idea for the Conference, which
the NATO countries resisted for some time and only agreed to in the larger context of the
Berlin and related accords. There was, nevertheless, considerable interest in assuring that
the Conference outcome served Western interests in such areas as human rights, economic
cooperation, and the environment. The NATO allies also considered it essential that the
U.S. and Canada not be excluded from participation. With the ECE likely to have a role in
implementing measures that might be agreed to in Helsinki, the U.S. decided to join the
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action on global warming can only be achieved by mandatory con-
servation of fossil fuels, the U.S. will have the most to lose from a
precedent which takes other countries' past reductions into
account.27
In terms of strengthening the international environmental re-
gime, major reforms are needed to deal effectively with regional
environmental issues. Necessary measures include (i) finding ways
to energize regional level efforts where they currently do not exist
or exist in name only (e.g., in Latin America, Asia, and Africa) and
(ii) bringing to a halt misguided efforts to find regional solutions
when none are needed.
3. Bilateral Issues
The preponderant fraction of environmental issues with inter-
national implications is bilateral and should be handled as such.
With few exceptions, bilateral negotiations are far more efficient
than multilateral diplomacy. Moreover, the problem of states seek-
ing compromises on unrelated issues as a condition of their cooper-
ation, which can be the scourge of multilateral diplomacy, is mini-
mized by bilateral negotiations. Other procedural and political
problems common to multilateral diplomacy, such as contentious
credential fights over the participation of unpopular governments,
can be avoided through bilateral accords.
Occasionally, there may be situations where bilateral problems
ECE. The author was in the European Bureau of the State Department at the time and
drafted the options papers which recommended U.S. membership in the ECE. The Conven-
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541, 18
I.L.M. 1442 (1979) (a harmless, toothless document), was subsequently signed in Geneva in
1979 by all signatories of the Helsinki Accord. See Fouere, Emerging Trends in Interna-
tional Environmental Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: THE
MANAGEMENT & RESOLUTION OF TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 34-36 (J.E. Car-
roll ed. 1988). While this history may justify U.S. adherence to the Transboundary Conven-
tion, it does not follow that American participation in the subsequent Nitrogen Oxide Pro-
tocol was similarly justified. After all, the U.S. stayed out of the negotiations of the Sulfur
Dioxide Protocol and is not a party to it.
278. The U.S. has the highest per capita energy use of any major country. Keller, Sci-
ence and Technology, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1990, at 123, 126. Other developed countries will
argue that much of the problem of global warming would be resolved if the U.S. begins to
use energy only at the lower levels already being achieved in Western Europe and Japan.
Those countries may point to the Nitrogen Oxide Protocol as precedent. While that may be
correct, it will make it that much harder to get the U.S. to the bargaining table on global
warming.
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can only be resolved in some larger context."' Nevertheless, the
vast majority of bilateral environmental issues should be handled
bilaterally. 80
Although the negotiations themselves should be bilateral, in-
ternational conventions may help by establishing general principles
which all nations should follow in their bilateral relations dealing
with pollution. For example, as discussed below, a convention
which adopted the principle that states are liable for significant
avoidable harm caused by trans-border pollution would be helpful.
4. National Level Problems
Most environmental problems are domestic in scope. Though
there are ample exceptions, field research on actual harm from pol-
lution shows that most pollutant releases have only local conse-
quences. Effectively addressing pollution at the global or regional
level is probably impossible, given strong nationalistic sentiments
in nearly all countries and the inefficiencies of the international
community. Even if it were possible to solve some domestic pollu-
tion issues through international action, attempting to do so rou-
tinely would be a mistake; the international consensus on most en-
vironmental issues is significantly less protective than the domestic
consensus in countries with strong environmental movements.
There are, however, three circumstances where domestic environ-
mental protection should become a topic for international
consideration.
a. Comparative Environmental Protection
Virtually every environmental problem faced by one country is
faced by others as well. For example, all countries have serious
problems with excessive biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) in
279. One common circumstance justifying raising the level of negotiations beyond that
needed to resolve the problem is where countries do not have diplomatic relations, or if they
do, the relations are poor. For example, given current political conditions, Syria, Lebanon,
and Israel will never meet to discuss the particularly severe pollution problems of the East-
ern Mediterranean, but they might participate in a conference of all the Mediterranean
littoral states. All three countries are parties to the Convention for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 290 (1976).
280. The point made in the text should seem so obvious as not to merit mention yet
international environmental negotiating strategy frequently suffers from diplomatic dilet-
tantism. There are strong pressures to regionalize or globalize problems which are inherently
national or bilateral in scope, in the mistaken belief that doing so will accelerate progress.
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their territorial waters from sewage and industrial pollution.28 l It
does not follow that we need an international convention on BOD.
The problems it causes can be severe but they are nearly always
localized. In those few cases where BOD causes problems across
international frontiers, bilateral negotiations are the appropriate
solution. 82 However, precisely because the problem is ubiquitous,
the nations of the world have much to learn from each other as to
the technologies for BOD removal and the regulatory approaches
which can be used. Fostering greater international contact among
scientists and regulators would bear significant results.
b. Domestic Issues Requiring Outside Expertise and
Financing
Developing nations often face environmental problems which
require highly technical solutions or capital requirements which
are beyond their financial capabilities. Bilateral aid programs, in-
ternational organizations, and the international financial institu-
tions have occasionally provided technical assistance or the finan-
cial wherewithal to attack the problems. Because effective
international environmental protection requires the cooperation of
all countries on some issues, it is essential to meet the special
needs of developing countries when they seek to solve their own
domestic environmental problems. Doing so will strengthen the
complex international environmental regime in two ways. First, it
will provide tangible benefits to developing countries, thereby giv-
ing them a greater stake in the regime. Second, it will help raise
environmental consciousness, putting to rest the notion, once com-
mon in developing countries, that environmental protection is ir-
relevant to their needs.2 83
281. Excessive BOD robs a stream of dissolved oxygen and in extreme cases can render
the water lifeless. The problem rarely persists at great distances because surface waters are
constantly taking additional oxygen from the atmosphere. See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA
484 (1990).
282. There are a few cases, such as the situation concerning the Rhine, where a regional
approach on BOD may be helpful.
283. As previously explained, developing countries are properly worried about the rela-
tionship between the benefits of specific environmental protection measures they are consid-
ering and the costs involved. Deciding on appropriate environmental policies is a difficult
task for developing countries and a useful topic for future scholarship. Moreover, the lack of
any environmental protection is a major impediment to development, particularly as it re-
lates to the public health. Indeed, a number of the most serious disease problems still facing
parts of the world are caused by inadequate or, more commonly, non-existent treatment of
human sewage.
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c. Domestic Issues Irresolvable Without International
Cooperation
International transport of hazardous waste, commerce in pesti-
cides and toxic substances, and protection of some endangered spe-
cies are environmental problems having the following special char-
acteristic: each nation possesses the theoretical authority to
prohibit the outcomes it seeks to avoid, yet in practice, no nation
can be successful solely by its own efforts. For these cases, interna-
tional cooperation is essential.
B. Nations Must Recognize a Universal Obligation to Pro-
tect the Global Environment
The wealthier nations of the world frequently will be unable to
resolve global environmental problems without the widespread co-
operation of the other countries. All countries must acknowledge
that they have a legal obligation to protect our common global her-
itage. This recognition, however, does not mean equal standards of
protection should be expected of all countries without reference to
the capacity to pay.
C. Developed Countries Must Recognize Their Obligation to
Provide Financial and Technical Resources
The developed countries need to acknowledge the corollary to
section B above: they must increase resources available to develop-
ing countries for environmental protection.
Observers may argue that the resources available in the devel-
oped countries for financial assistance to developing countries are
already badly stretched and that additional funds cannot be made
available. There are three answers to this objection. First, on many
environmental issues, the greatest need is for technical assistance
which may be less expensive to provide than cash and politically
more acceptable. Second, a willingness to spend money on a prob-
lem is one of the key indicators of genuine concern.28 Third, and
perhaps most importantly, on some issues, measures taken by de-
veloping countries may often save developed countries from having
to adopt even more stringent and costly measures at home. For
284. In colloquial terms, a developed country should "put its money where its mouth
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example, a vigorous program of tropical rain forest conservation
and replanting previously cleaned and abandoned land might sub-
stantially reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere,
thereby forcing less drastic cuts in carbon dioxide releases in de-
veloped countries. The developed countries should be prepared to
share those savings with cooperating developing countries. If addi-
tional moneys are not provided, it strongly suggests that the devel-
oped countries are only giving lip service to the need for effective
international environmental protection.
D. Nations Must Recognize an Obligation to Try to Accom-
modate the Environmental Interests of Other Nations
If a complex international environmental protection regime is
to emerge and take hold, the norm of mutual accommodation
needs to go beyond monetary and technical assistance. The success
of the regime will also require that countries agree to undertake
some environmental measures that they would rather avoid, in or-
der to have the support of other countries on environmental mat-
ters of special interest to them. Naturally, there are limits as to
how far this can be expected to go. Countries will not undertake
measures which are sharply in conflict with their vital, national in-
terests.""s Nevertheless, nations should be willing to support issues
contrary to their individual preferences, if they want other nations
to do so on environmental matters of concern to them.
Adoption of these principles does not mean there needs to be
an explicit quid pro quo for each measure which a particular coun-
try may favor. To the contrary, the issues should not be tightly
coupled, as doing so makes negotiations far more difficult. Instead,
there should be a "grand bargain," in which all nations agree 1)
that all nations must protect the common environment to the ex-
tent they are able and 2) that the developed nations must help the
developing nations reach that goal.
2 8 6
To see how such an approach might work, consider the follow-
ing example. Taken in isolation, there was some merit in the Rea-
285. While one would like to think the international community could someday get to
that position, it is distinctly contrary to the normal expectations of how nation-states
behave.
286. It would be difficult, and probably pointless, to try to get this grand bargain estab-
lished in binding treaty language. Given the characteristics of a regime, it is unnecessary for
the principle to be adopted in a binding form, so long as it becomes a recognized norm of
international relations.
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gan administration's opposition to an international pesticide regis-
try. If, however, the U.S. were animated more strongly by a desire
to build an effective international environmental regime, it would
have taken a different approach. For example, the U.S. could have
made the following statement to the developing nations:
We do not agree that the proposed measures are necessary or
helpful. They will impose costs on pesticide producers which will
be passed on to consumers, including those in developing coun-
tries. Nevertheless, we will go along with your proposal. We
hope you will do the same for us as other environmental issues
arise of special importance to us.
E. Nations Must Recognize and Begin to Implement an Ob-
ligation Not to Do Each Other Significant Environmental Harm
Closely related to the need for countries to assist each other is
the need for them to halt trans-boundary environmental harm to
the extent they are able to do so. At present, polluting one's neigh-
boring countries is far more common than not doing so. The conse-
quences of this pattern are palpable environmental damage and
harm to the international environmental regime.
One closely related difficulty is the lack of a strong interna-
tional framework for considering and resolving trans-boundary en-
vironmental problems. Such a framework need not be a new insti-
tutional superstructure; indeed, for reasons discussed more
thoroughly above, that is politically non-negotiable and perhaps
undesirable. 87
The first needed change is international adoption of the prin-
ciple that each nation has a binding legal obligation not to impose
significant, actual environmental harm on neighboring countries or,
at a minimum, an obligation to refrain from doing so if the harm
could reasonably have been avoided, given the polluting country's
level of development. Although this principle has been repeatedly
asserted by commentators"" and was articulated at the 1972
Stockholm Conference (in somewhat hedged terms), no court has
based a decision on the theory that this obligation is a part of cus-
287. See supra text at part IV(C).
288. See J. Lammers, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-
Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in TRANSFRON'nER POLLUTION
AND INTMRNATIONAL LAW 89, 94 (1985).
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tomary international law.289 Similarly, there is no binding interna-
tional convention of broad applicability to that effect, though a few
special purpose treaties contain the principle. The topic is rarely
addressed in bilateral Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation trea-
ties or other agreements by which countries lay out the basic con-
ditions of friendly relations.
A global convention making each nation strictly liable for any
environmental damages or risk of harm it caused in any other
country, regardless of the feasibility of preventing the harm and
irrespective of the nation's level of development, would be impossi-
ble to negotiate. 290 The alternative of setting global minimum pol-
lution control standards which all countries must meet would
probably also be impossible to agree upon and would not be worth
much if achieved.29 Most countries would also reject the proposi-
tion that their industries could be required to meet the pollution
control standards of neighboring countries, particularly since many
environmental statutes are designed to provide a wide margin of
safety from the risk of harm, not merely prevent actual harm.
212
A more modest proposal having somewhat better prospects for
success would be a convention which established the principle that
countries may not allow their industries to cause significant actual
harm in neighboring countries, provided only that effective control
measures were technically and economically feasible given the pol-
luting country's level of development. Such a principle could be
contained in a treaty of widespread application, either at the
289. The Trail Smelter Arbitration between the U.S. and Canada held that recovery
was possible on the facts of that case, where a single source of pollution caused damage in a
neighboring country. Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1911 (1938). As a matter of international law, the case is notable for its singularity. There
are cases decided under domestic law where courts had jurisdiction over foreign defendants,
but the number is remarkably small. Most cases today would not involve such clear facts as
Trail Smelter. Far more commonly, cases will involve harm clearly attributable to upstream
or up-wind sources of pollution, but with the damaged party unable to identify the guilty
facility. The Trail Smelter decision is inapposite in such situations.
290. Would Mexico be willing to pay the U.S. damages for an elevated risk of harm
even though no actual harm was shown? Given the differences in resources and political
differences, would Zambia compensate South Africa, or North Korea compensate Japan,
even if real harm were demonstrated?
291. Truly global minimum standards are likely to suffer severely from the lowest com-
mon denominator phenomenon. For pollution control, that lowest common denominator is
no control at all.
292. Even with the U.S., that principle has been highly controversial. See, e.g., Cham-
pion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988), and Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595
(10th Cir. 1990). In both cases, the polluting states strongly objected to effluent limits neces-
sary to meet water quality standards of the downstream state.
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global or regional level, with the details of the guarantees worked
out in bilateral treaties or separate agreements among commonly
affected countries.
A second, closely related need is for nations either to allow
their courts to enforce foreign judgments for environmental dam-
ages caused by domestic industry or, where that is not possible for
technical or political reasons, to assume the obligation themselves
to pay the damages.293
A third need is to drop the requirement which some countries
have that environmental standards in the downstream or down-
wind state must be as stringent as their own before harmful pollu-
tion can be abated, as the U.S. CAA does.294 Such requirements
encourage blatantly political determinations.299 A possible solution
is to have lower standards for reciprocity than are imposed domes-
tically. Given differing levels of development, such minimum stan-
dards might vary considerably by region.
F. Consensus is Needed That Some Actions Must be Taken
Before the Full Weight of Scientific Evidence is Available
Ordinarily, prudence dictates that one not act on potential
problems until it is certain they exist. Otherwise, in a world where
needs greatly outstrip the capacity of the international community
to meet them, precious resources will be squandered and more
pressing problems will not be addressed. However, experience with
293. Except for especially close legal systems, such as the U.S. and Canada or within
the EC, nation-states will not commonly allow foreign court actions in the environmental
field to be given effect in their territories (e.g., enforcing criminal judgments or specific per-
formance orders). Far less severe restrictions on sovereignty would be involved, however, if
civil judgments for monetary damages were enforced. Placing the obligation on governments
to pay such judgments would have the welcome advantage of eliminating very difficult issues
of proof that often arise in cross-border pollution problems. For example, if any of 30 plants
on a river having its origin in country A are responsible for severe degradation of water
quality in downstream country B, the government of country A could be held liable for
actual harm caused to economic assets or human health even if the harmed parties in coun-
try B could not prove which plants were responsible. See R. FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 236-46 (1981).
29.4. The CAA, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 115, 91 Stat. 685, 710 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642, 7415(c) (1988)). Note, there is a revamped CAA out. The CAA of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
295. An example of such a political determination was the refusal of the U.S. govern-
ment to certify that Canadian air pollution controls were comparable to U.S. controls when
a fair reading reported they were different, but on balance about as stringent. Cf. New York
v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1483-84 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
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several recently identified global environmental problems suggests
we need to revise our thinking as to what constitutes prudent be-
havior. The international community has not been consistent on
the level of scientific evidence needed to trigger action. On ozone
depletion, the U.S. took the lead in convincing the international
community of the need to act immediately as opposed to later
when the ozone layer might already be seriously depleted. Never-
theless, on the acid rain and global warming issues, it was the U.S.
which argued for restraint pending the outcome of additional
research.
A global consensus is needed concerning the amount of proof
necessary to initiate international action. There may be merit in a
three-tiered approach along the following lines. First, even incon-
clusive or preliminary scientific evidence of adverse global effects
should trigger a sharp increase in research. Second, substantial but
inconclusive evidence of likely harm should set off those measures
which should be done anyway for other reasons or which will be
the most cost effective. Third, the most stringent, expensive, or
disruptive measures should be adopted only when there is clear
scientific evidence of the need to do so.
For example, in 1978 when the U.S. banned the use of CFCs
for aerosol propulsion, the evidence was not as conclusive as it is
now that CFCs cause ozone depletion. On the other hand, alterna-
tives to CFCs were already available for use as aerosol propellants.
The change brought about a substantial reduction in short term
emissions with a minimum of economic disruption. That bought
time, during which the evidence became compelling.
In this spirit, U.S. Secretary of State Baker has urged greater
international efforts at energy conservation and tree-planting, ar-
guing that these actions are inherently desirable and will help sub-
stantially on global warming.2 90 More drastic steps, he argues, can
await further research.
297
296. In his State of the Union Message of January 31, 1990, President Bush called for a
program to plant one billion trees per year for the next ten years in the U.S. Schneider,
Bush Offers a Feel-Good Pep Talk, L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, at M1, col. 1. While estimates
vary, such a program could reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by an amount equal to
one percent of total global carbon dioxide releases. The U.S. acting alone cannot solve the
problem. However, other countries following suit can make a modest dent can be made in
the problem. Even if global warming turns out to be less of a problem than most scientists
now predict, the effort will have been worthwhile, as tree planting is relatively inexpensive,
and most places would benefit from having more trees.
297. The author agrees with the principle but not the specific policy conclusions which
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
G. Key Governments Must Begin Acting in Accordance with
Their Rhetoric
The ability of governments to make somber but carefully
hedged encouraging statements on matters on which they have lit-
tle or no genuine interest is a wonder to behold. Unfortunately, in
their early stages, it is difficult to differentiate between issues in-
volving nothing more than lip service and issues which the world
community genuinely believes are important. The first non-binding
steps are being taken on these latter issues which will lay the
groundwork for more concrete measures later.
There are, fortunately, several tests which help determine
whether governments consider an issue to be a "real" one.
First, on important issues, governments are prepared to un-
dergo detriments to their domestic well-being to foster their inter-
national diplomacy. For example, in the interest of expanded
world trade, nations have had to cut back on tariffs which prop up
domestic industry. Similarly, the world was more willing to believe
that the Carter Administration was genuinely concerned about nu-
clear nonproliferation once it took steps contrary to the interests of
the U.S. domestic nuclear power industry.2"
Second, as previously discussed, on vital issues, governments
are prepared to spend large amounts of money.
Third, senior government officials personally raise issues they
care about. The communiques of meetings between heads of state
and foreign ministers are replete with language on matters the sen-
ior officials have not actually discussed or have only touched on for
the record. Where senior officials actually raise matters with their
counterparts, it is an indication that the issue is of concern to
them. International human rights became a high-profile issue only
the President and his advisors draw from it. Using Secretary Baker's reasoning, far more
could be justified in terms of energy conservation than the Administration has proposed to
date. Such energy conservation would reduce greenhouse gases and thus may help with
global warming. Even if global warming proves to be an illusion, greater energy conservation
is worth undertaking in any event given the reduced urban air pollution, acid rain, and
energy use which energy conservation measures would automatically bring about. The same
could be said for measures to greatly expand resource recycling.
298. The Nuclear Industry is Aglow Over Reagan, Bus. Wr., Nov. 24, 1980, at 43 (In-
dustrial ed.). Many countries thought those policies were misguided, but the sincerity was
not seriously questioned once it became clear the U.S. was prepared to make domestic sacri-
fices in the interest of those policies.
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after senior officials in several countries began discussing it
personally.
Fourth, on major issues, substantial governmental non-mone-
tary resources are committed. For years, the U.S. and the Soviet
Union talked about preventing inadvertent nuclear war, but did
little to avoid it. More recently, however, the "hotlines" between
Washington and Moscow have been upgraded, crisis control cen-
ters were established, high level discussions were held between the
senior-most U.S. military officials and their Soviet counterparts,
agreements were reached on minimizing the risk of incidents.2'9
The point is not the wisdom or the sufficiency of these measures
but rather that they indicate that the respective governments fi-
nally ate willing to take concrete steps to minimize the risks of
accidental war.
Finally, on the most important matters, high-level personnel
are assigned to work exclusively on the problem. Like establishing
a study commission, creating offices and titles is sometimes a step
governments take to create the illusion of action. Nevertheless,
naming high-level personnel to handle a matter is important be-
cause governments rarely become seized of an issue without devot-
ing the full-time attention of high-ranking officials. For example,
the Carter Administration created a new Assistant Secretary, of
State position with a modest staff to devote full time to interna-
tional human rights.300 On the other hand, the dismal failures in
U.S. efforts to halt the spread of ballistic missile technology could
be predicted from the lack of even one senior official in the U.S.
government for whom this was his or her primary responsibility. In
making his proposal to raise the EPA to cabinet level, President
Bush cited the need for the EPA Administrator to have a status
equal to his counterparts in other governments.30 '
When measured against these standards, are international en-
vironmental protection efforts genuine or only a matter of lip ser-
vice? The answer is that it is a mixed picture. Clearly on ozone
depletion, the U.S. and some other governments were prepared to
impair the economic well being of the multi-billion dollar CFC in-
299. Inside the Pentagon, Proprietary to United Press Int'l, July 27, 1985 (wire ser-
vice); Cruise-Mishaps, Reuters, Jan. 3, 1985 (wire service); Soviet Chief of Staff Ends Visit
to United States, Tass, Oct. 6, 1990 (wire service).
300. Lardner, Human Rights Spokesman Reported Chosen, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1981,
at A12, col. 1.
301. See Morgenson & Eisenstodt, Profits Are for Rape and Pillage, FoRBES, Mar. 5,
1990, at 94; Adding to the Cabinet Surplus, EcONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1990, at 28.
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dustry to protect the environment. On acid rain, the high level at-
tention given by senior Canadian officials finally convinced the
U.S. that political relations with Canada would deteriorate without
U.S. action, but the lack of any concrete steps for years indicated
that the U.S. was not serious no matter what U.S. officials said.
Some nations appear to be ready to adopt expensive measures to
reduce global warming, the U.S., however, is not among them.
Hardly any nations are prepared to take major steps to reduce
trans-border pollution outside the context of acid precipitation. A
few care deeply about maritime pollution issues, but most pay no
real attention to other global commons issues.
If the U.S. cares as much about international environmental
problems as it proclaims, then the U.S. should act the part.302 One
hears around Washington that the President, the Secretary of
State, and other top U.S. officials are virtually never the first to
raise environmental issues, though they are interested enough to
be prepared to respond. The U.S. government has not allocated
sufficient resources to allow the U.S. to exercise greater leadership.
Granted, at a time of budgetary reductions, finding money for re-
search and "slots" for additional personnel is difficult, but they are
somehow found for other pressing matters. Above all, it would be
desirable for the President to name a Special Ambassador for In-
ternational Environmental Protection, with the authority to coor-
dinate all U.S. international. efforts, and to undertake, necessary
steps domestically. The individual selected should preferably be
someone the President personally knows, likes, and trusts and who
would have direct access to him. The Administrator of the EPA
has been attempting to perform that role but is not in a position to
do so. On the emerging international environmental issues of great-
est concern, many agencies, other than the EPA, have the neces-
302. The U.S. decided, for human rights reasons, not to invite China to a White House
sponsored conference on Scientific and Economic Research Related to Global Change. This
conference was billed as the centerpiece of the President's efforts on global warming. Those
same human rights concerns did not interfere with the decision to let China launch U.S.-
made communication satellites or to continue China's most-favored-nation trade status.
Without Chinese participation and given the size of China's population and its plans to
expand coal production, efforts to slow global warming by reducing the use of fossil fuels are
probably pointless. See Rosenthal, U.S. Bans China From Pollution Talks, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 16, 1990, at B7, col. 4. This is not the place to assess the merits of the Administration's
China policy and its relationship to human rights. However, by its selection of which mat-
ters are important enough to warrant contact with China despite human rights concerns, the
Administration demonstrates that environmental matters have a very low priority when
compared with satellite launches or the importation of Chinese textiles.
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sary expertise and regulatory powers.303
VI. CONCLUSION
As a global community, we face a long list of environmental
problems. Some, like global warming, stratospheric ozone deple-
tion, and desertification are potentially very serious, threatening
global health, the adequacy of food-stocks, and much of the eco-
nomic progress achieved by developed and developing countries
alike. Others, like the loss of genetic diversity, plastic pollution of
the oceans, and international traffic in hazardous waste do not con-
jure visions of a near-term Apocalypse, but nevertheless will deter-
mine the kind of world we leave to future generations.
On any particular global environmental problem, reasonable
people can differ on the certainty of the risk, the seriousness of the
consequences, and the appropriateness of the proposed remedies.
Yet, when all global environmental problems are considered to-
gether, the only reasonable conclusion is that the response of the
international community to date has been inadequate. This inade-
quacy has led some environmentalists and legal scholars to con-
clude that a fundamental change is needed in the international or-
der. Nations, they say, must cede major portions of their
sovereignty to new supra-national institutions armed with suffi-
cient powers to compel adequate environmental protection
everywhere.
If this view is correct, it is grounds for deep pessimism, for
nations will not willingly cede sovereignty on this score, or any
other. Even if we can move toward a new international order in
which national sovereignty plays a substantially smaller role, pro-
gress toward that goal (if there is progress at all) will come very
slowly. We do not have the time: most global environmental
problems require significant progress by the international commu-
nity before the end of the century.
Fortunately, there is a middle course between business as
303. For example, the Departments of Energy, Interior, and Agriculture, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission all have roles on
global warming at least as important as that of the EPA, if not more so. The Departments
of Commerce, Interior, Transportation, and Treasury are all more involved with marine
mammal protection, endangered species protection, and maritime pollution issues than the
EPA. Merely elevating the EPA to cabinet status, as President Bush has proposed to the
Congress, will accomplish nothing with respect to the capacity of the head of the EPA to
represent the U.S. on those issues which will remain largely out of EPA's control.
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usual and resting all our hopes on the remote prospects for a fun-
damental change in the nature of the international system: we can
begin building a stronger international environmental regime
within the confines of the existing international order. A good deal
of useful groundwork has already been laid. Greatly strengthening
the existing regime will require relatively modest increases in fi-
nancial resources, in the strength and vision of leadership, in
global political will, in diplomatic effort, and in the further devel-
opment of international legal principles and institutions. These
measures are within our grasp.
